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THE SINO-JAPANESE FISHERIES AGREE-
MENT OF 1975: A COMPARISON WITH 
OTHER NORTH-PACIFIC 
FISHERIES AGREEMENTS 
SoNG YooK HoNG* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As the restrictions imposed on the Japanese fishing industry 
by the Allied Powers were relaxed in early 1950's, the long-
standing fishery disputes in the East Asian Seas began to reopen. 
The fishery talks between China and Japan were directly 
motivated by successive Chinese seizures of Japanese fishing 
vessels operating off Chinese coasts in the Yell ow and East China 
Seas. The seizures began on December 7, 1950. As far as Japan 
was concerned, it was desirable in the absence of formal 
diplomatic relations to have such incidents avoided in every 
reasonable way.1 For a practical solution, an agreement between 
the Fisheries Association of China (thP- Chinese Association) and 
the Japan-China Fisheries Association of Japan (the Japanese 
Association) Concerning Fisheries in the Yell ow and East China 
Seas (the non-governmental arrangement) was first made in April 
1955.2 
* S.J.D. candidate, Harvard Law School. The present paper was prepared 
under the guidance of Professor Louis B. Sohn in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements of the S.J.D. The views expressed here are those of the author. 
1. However, for a particular purpose, the form of the non-governmental 
agreement has sometimes been used, in spite of maintaining diplomatic relations. 
For example, the Japan-Indonesia Fisheries Agreement was made as a provisional 
non-governmental agreement in order to avoid disputes over the Indonesian 
archipelagic waters and 12-mile territorial sea measured from straight lines joining 
the outermost islands. It was signed on July 27, 1968 at Djakarta between the 
Director-General of Fisheries of Indonesia and the Representative of the National 
Federation of Fisheries Association and the Federation of Japan Tuna Fisheries 
Co-operative Association. See 17 Jap. Ann. Int'l L. 136-7 (1973). Another non-
governmental agreement was made in accordance with Article 8 of the Korea-
Japan Fishenes Convention on December 7, 1965 between Korean and Japanese 
civilian fishing industries to deal with the safety regulation of fishing operation. 
See Korean Office of Fisheries, A Collection of Decrees on the Korea-Japan 
Fisheries Convention (in Korean) 135-39 (1968). Even under the present Sino-
Japanese governmental agreement, a new non-governmental arrangement 
concerning the safety regulation and navigational rules, will be agreed between 
the civilian Fisheries Associations of the two states. For details, see infra at text 
accompanying note 105. 
2. For convenience in making distinctions between the Sino-Japanese non-
governmental and governmental agreements, on the one hand, and between the 
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In June 1958 when the first non-governmental arrangement 
expired, the Chinese Association refused its renewal on account of 
the unfriendly Japanese foreign policy toward China. Therefore, 
there was no agreement between the two parties from June 1958 
until December 1963 when the second arrangement came into 
force. The second arrangement expired in December 1965, and was 
replaced by a third one. The third arrangement of 1965 remained 
in effect until June 22, 1975.3 
In late 1960's, Chinese fishermen began to show their interest 
in seining operations off their coast. In December 1970, the 
Regulation of the Chinese Association and the Japanese Associa-
tion Concerning Purse-Seining with Lighting Ships (the non-
governmental seine fishing arrangement) was signed to deal with 
newly arising problems of seine operations in the form of a 
supplement to the third arrangement of 1965. As a result, from the 
beginning until 1970, the three arrangements dealt with the 
regulation of trawl fishing only; beginning in 1971, the operations 
of seine fishing also have been r-egulated in a mutually agreed 
upon form.4 
In accordance with Article 9 of the Joint Communique 
between China and Japan, signed at Peking in September 1972,5 
Japan has made many efforts to transform the non-governmental 
arrangements into a governmental one before the former expired 
on June 22, 1975. Eventually the governments of Japan and 
China signed an Agreement on Fisheries between Japan and the 
People's Republic of China (the governmental agreement) on 
August 15, 1975, at Tokyo, which replaced the earlier non-
governmental arrangement on December 22, 1975, when the 
parties exchanged notes. 6 
Sino-Japanese governmental agreement and the other fisheries agreements in the 
North Pacific Ocean, on the other hand, three different terms are employed 
hereafter. The "arrangement" will denote the Sino-Japanese non-governmental 
agreement, while the "agreement" will refer to the Sino-Japanese governmental 
agreement and the "convention" will mean the three fisheries agreements 
concerning the North Pacific Ocean. 
3. For the Sino-Japanese non-governmental fisheries talks, see infra note 65. 
4. In this paper, trawlers represent the double-dragger and single-boat purse-
seines (Art. 2(1) of the third non-governmental arrangement) and seiners mean 
purse-seiners with lighting ships (preamble of the non-governmental seine fishing 
arrangement). 
5. The Fishery Agreement was the fourth and last pending administrative 
agreement to be signed between the Chinese and Japanese governments under the 
China-Japan Joint Communique of September 1972. For the text of the 
Communique, see 17 Jap. Ann. Int'l L. 81-83 (1973). 
6. Asahi Shinbun (a Japanese Daily), at 1 (December 22, 1975). 
1975 SINO-JAPANESE FISHERIES AGREEMENT 3 
Previously, Japan made several fisheries agreements with 
other states such as the Republic of Korea, the Soviet Union, 
Canada and the United States. But the governmental agreement 
contains its own distinctive features, because it relates to a semi-
enclosed sea, and was concluded at the turning point in the 
history of the law of the sea, when the majority of the nations 
were approaching a general consensus on the concept of a 200-
mile economic zone. 
This paper intends to describe the general background of 
fisheries in China and Japan and the structures of the previous 
non-governmental arrangements; to compare the governmental 
and non-governmental agreements; and to compare the govern-
mental agreement with other fisheries agreements dealing with 
the disputes over the North Pacific fishing grounds. An analytical 
comparison will be made about the Chinese military zones with 
some other maritime security zones and the legal connection of 
the zones with the fishing rights will be discussed. Last, the paper 
will analyze the possible influences of the present Agreement on 
hypothetical situations arising from the advent of a 200-mile 
economic zone, as applied to the East Asian Seas. 
II. GENERAL BACKGROUND 
A. Geographical Facts 
The legal problems of fisheries always have a close interrela-
tion with the facts of geography. Thus, it may be useful to describe 
the geographical factors which influence the fishery species in the 
Yell ow and East China Seas. 
The Yellow Sea. Properties of the water in the region are 
important factors affecting the habitats of fisheries. About 50% of 
the suspended sediments in the Yell ow Sea is detrial clay and silt; 
the rest is organic material derived from land areas or produced in 
the sea from nutrients contributed by the rivers such as the 
Yangtze, Yellow, and Liao Rivers of China and the Han, Taedong 
and Yalu Rivers of Korea. 7 
The East China Sea. The distribution of sediments is similar 
to that of the Yellow Sea, i.e., silt and clay on the inner half and 
sands of the outer shelf. 8 
7. K. Emery et al., "Geological Structure and Some Water Characteristics of 
the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea," 2 Tech. Bull. 13 (1969) (Bangkok, 
Economic Commission for Asia and Far East-ECAFE). 
8. See K. Emery, "Geological Structure and Some Water Characteristics of 
the East China and The Yellow Sea," 1 Tech. Bull. 13-17 (1968) (Bangkok, 
Economic Commission for Asia and Far East-ECAFE). 
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In addition, currents and tides are also influential fadors by 
which the two fishing grounds have become richer in fisheries. A 
stream of the North Equatorial current (black current) moves 
northward through these regions up to the Pohai Bay of China; it 
is some 300 kilometers wide and 200 meters deep, and moves at 
the rate of 50 to 75 kilometers a day, depending on the wind and 
the season. When it returns back to southward from Pohai Bay, it 
flows along the mainland coast of China as a cold current, having 
been cooled down by the Kamchatka Current (cold current) 
flowing southward along the Siberian and Korean coasts. The 
mixing of the warm current and the cold current produces 
optimum fishing grounds. To this mixture of currents is added a 
phenomenal tide, which is also an important factor of fishing life. 
On the average, the difference between high and low tide along 
the west coast of Korea is about six meters, with a maximum of 
9. 7 meters at Inchon; along the east coast of China the difference 
is about three meters, with a maximum of fifteen meters at 
Hangchou Bay south of Shanghai.9 
These optimum conditions for a habitat of fisheries in the 
Yellow Sea and the East China Sea have traditionally aroused the 
interest of fishing industry, particularly those of Japanese who 
long landed various fish in these grounds. Thus, disputes over 
fishing rights in the regions are regarded as in part a natural 
result of the geography which arouses competing interests of the 
fishermen concerned. 
B. Fi§Jhing lindu§~li"Y 
The fishing industry in China and Japan is of special 
. importance. Fish is the most cheaply produced form of protein 
food and a valuable supplement to these countries' diets. The 
Japanese as well as the Chinese are less fastidious than 
Westerners about the kinds of fish they eat. In view of world fish 
catches, Japan has become the first magnitude state, while China 
the second magnitude. 
1. China 
The Chinese fishing industry has not only been resuscitated 
but also has been completely reorganized and expanded since the 
establishment ofthe Peking regime in 1949.10 The fishing industry 
9. Korean Office of Fisheries, Fisheries in Korea 60-61 (Seoul, 1986). 
10. See Ch'ing and Li, "The Problem of Increasing Fishery Production and the 
Direction in Processing," 3 Hsin·hua pan-yuea·k' an (New China Semi-Monthly), 
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was helped in several ways. The fishermen were instructed to 
form cooperatives and, later, communes, and they were advanced 
loans to build vessels and facilities such as trawlers, canneries 
and fish-processing plants.n By improving of transportation of 
fish production, vast fish markets were formed, and scientific 
research on fisheries was not neglected. 12 The industry thus 
became unified and centralized and, to a considerable extent, 
modernized. 
The fisheries of China may be classified into three categories, 
viz., coastal, offshore and inland waters. Not many Chinese 
people have traditionally ventured a fishing voyage far from their 
coastal waters; hence, deep-sea fishing was not highly developed. 
But coastal or inland fisheries, in contrast, have always been 
highly developed. Due to coastal topography13 and pressure of 
population, 14 most of the Chinese fishermen have historically 
engaged in the inshore fisheries since the eleventh century B.C. 
The fresh-water fisheries account for about a third of the total 
annual catch of fish. 
Fish farming goes back two thousand years. The Yangtze 
delta has been used for fish-breeding, especially the rearing of the 
carp. The chief fishing bases here are Luta, Chefoo and Tsingtao. 
The offshore fisheries, however, are best developed in the Chousan 
No. 4, at 855 (1951) and Kao, "The Recovery and Development of Aquatic Products 
Work," id. at 857. 
11. See Cheng, "Communist China and the Law of the Sea," 63 Am. J. Int'l L. 
49, particularly nn.lO, 11 (1969); H. Robinson, Monsoon Area: A Geographical 
Survey 416 (1967). 
12. For fishery research in China, see Western Pacific Fisheries Research 
Comm'n., The Collection of Thesis of the 5th Annual Meeting (in Korean) 183-306 
(published in North Korea, 1964). A multinational agreement between China, 
North Korea, North VietNam, and the Soviet Union established this Commission 
with some enforcement functions to draw up necessary measures in accordance 
with scientific data for protecting and increasing fishery resources. For the text of 
the Western Pacific Fisheries, Oceanology, and Limnology Research Cooperation 
Agreement of June 12, 1956, see 87 Hsin-hua pan-yuea-k' an (New China Semi-
Monthly) 60-61 (published in PRC, 1956). 
13. The total area of coastal and offshore fishing grounds to the depth of 200 
meters along the coasts of China is approximately 1/2 million square kilometers, 
which comprises as much as 23.7 percent of the world total and is therefore larger 
than that of any other country. For details, see Park, "Fishing under Troubled 
Waters: The Northeast Asia Fisheries Controversy", 2 Ocean Develop. Int'l L. J. 
No. 2, 96, n.10 (1974). 
14. Although Chinese fishery produces about 7 million tons annually, the total 
catch in relation to the numbers of people, over 800 million, is relatively meagre; 
the per capita output is small, hence the per capita consumption is not large. 
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Archipelago, where Chousan is a great fishing center and market, 
and along the greatly articulated south coasts (map 1).15 
2. Japan 
In Japan, there are two natural conditions by which many 
Japanese people have been forced to engage in fishing industry.16 
One is the pressure on the available cultivable land,17 and the 
other is comparatively favorable conditions for coastal fisheries 
due to the abundance of plankton and marine life arising from the 
mixture of cold and warm waters. 
Over 85% of the Japanese fishing industry is, like those of 
Korea and South Africa, substantially regulated by laws.18 The 
Japanese regulations, however, are not as rigidly imposed and 
inflexible as the centrally planned Soviet schemes. Nor are the 
regulations as limited as in Canada and in the United States. 
The fisheries may be classified, by location of fishing 
grounds, into four categories, namely, the distant-water, offshore, 
coastal and inland fisheries. The distant-water fisheries consist of 
the large-scale mothership-type bottomfish fishery in the northern 
Pacific, the bottomfish fishery in the Atlantic Ocean, the tuna 
longline fishery (including skipjack pole-lining), and the 
mothership-type salmon fishery and king crab fishery in the 
northern North Pacific. The offshore fisheries comprise middle-
seized trawling, purse seining and other net fishing in the offshore 
waters around Japan. The coastal fisheries include smaller-scale 
operations by various types of gear. The fresh water fisheries are 
not so conspicuously developed, compared with those of China.19 
For meeting the great home demand, approximately 90% of 
the fish catch is presently consumed as food internally; the 
remainder is used for the preparation of oil, meal and fertilizer. 20 
15. For details, see Robinson, supra note 11, at 415-16. 
16. For the number of persons engaged in fishing industry and number of 
fishing enterprises, see The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Mfairs, Fishing 
Industry in Japan 15 (1968). 
17. See Robinson supra note 11, at 508 et seq. 
18. See Comitini, "Economic and Legal Aspects of Japanese Fisheries 
Regulation and Control," 43 Wash. L. Rev. 179, especially n.1 (1967); W. 
Herrington, "Operation of the Japanese Fishery Management System" (Occa-
sional Paper No. 11, Law of the Sea Institute, U. of R. I.) at 3-10 (1971). 
19. For recent Japanese fish catches, see Research Institute for Ocean 
Economics, 6 Data for Marine Industry Research (in Japanese) No. 1, 31 (1975). 
20. For example, even the isopod is sometimes eaten in Japan, though it is not 
well suited for human consumption. See The New York Times, p. 56, col. 4 
(January 13, 1976). 
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China's Major Fishing Areas (Map 1) 
• Majot Fishing Ports 
Ningpo Marketing Centres 
Sources: 
1,000,000 
500,000 
250,000 
100,000 
(Est. fish production in 1964 in metric tons.) 
H. Robinson, Monsoon Asia: A Geographical Survey 415 (1967) 
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The consumption of fish per capita thus is the highest in the 
world.21 
C. Political and Legal Need for Non-Governmental 
Arrangements 
The need for a fisheries agreement between Japan and China 
was a regional problem in the East Asian Seas. It seems therefore 
necessary to discuss the regional fisheries relations as a whole. 
Japan, as a distant-water fishing nation, has traditionally caused 
fisheries frictions with its two neighbors (Korea and China). The 
regional disputes will be explained in the light of post "MacArthur 
Line~' effects on the fisheries relations between Japan and China, 
on the one hand, and between Korea and Japan on the other 
hand. 
1. Restrictions on the Japanese Fisheries 
During the allied occupation of Japan (1945-52), the Japanese 
fishing industry had been restrictively affected by several orders 
of the Occupation Authorities. At the beginning, the orders were 
intended to prohibit but later only to limit Japanese fisheries 
within certain areas. The restrictive measures were implemented, 
among others, by the so-called "MacArthur Line," by which 
Japanese fishing activities were limited in terms of the period, 
area, fishing instruments and species designated. The building of 
fishing vessels was also under control. 
Due to a food crisis in Japan, however, such restrictions soon 
became lessened. On September 14, 1945, the first decree was 
issued to allow Japanese fishing vessels -of limited capacity to 
operate within 12 miles of the coast. 22 Again, on September 27, 
21. See Office of the Prime Minister, Japan Statistical Yearbook 602 (1966). 
For example, a comparative table shows the daily consumption of fish per capita 
in 1964: 
Food Protein Calories 
Total (in grams) 1239.1 74.4 222.6 
Fish (in grams) 86.3 17.5 116.4 
22. There were a series of four decrees easing the restrictions during the first 
two months: Sept. 14, 22, 27; Oct. 13. For further details, see 1949-1952 The Japan 
Year Book 435-448 (Tokyo, 1952); Oda, "Conclusion of Non-Governmental Fishery 
Agreement between Japan and the People's Republic of China," Jurist (in 
Japanese) No. 84, 29-34 (1955); Ohira and Kuwahara, "Fishery Problems between 
Japan and the People's Republic of China," 3 Jap. Ann. Int'l L. 109, 109-110 
(1959); Shutsugyono Tebiki-Nikkan Gyogyo Kyotei Kantai (Fishing Manual 
1975 SINO-JAPANESE FISHERIES AGREEMENT 9 
1945, the fishing zone was significantly expanded eastward to 150 
degrees of east longitude and southward to 30 degrees of north 
latitude. This line of delimitation was then called the "MacArthur 
Line" (map 2). In June 1946, the second large-scale extension and 
in September 1949, the third were made and thus the fishing areas 
reached the central Pacific as far eastward as 180 degrees of east 
longitude. Finally, in May 1950, tuna fishing was allowed as far 
south as the Equator. The line of demarcation on the west between 
Korea and Japan did not change to any significant extent because 
of the narrowness of the Korea Strait (map 2). 
50 120 
40 
JO 
20 
10 
0 
The MacArthur Line 
150 160 
The Pacific Ocean 
170 
(Map 2) 
180 
I 
I 
,--- -l 
' I 
......... ~ - - - -. - - - - ,... - -; - --! 
• 
I 
'L 
In about two years after surrender, many Japanese fishing 
vessels were newly built, due largely to the positive support of the 
Japanese Government. The total fishing capacity, with 57 otter 
trawlers and 963 bull trawlers, exceeded by the end of 1951 that of 
relating to Japan·Korea Fisheries Agreement) 146-147 (Tokyo, 1965); G. Weissberg, 
Recent Developments in the Law of the Sea and the Japanese-Korean Fishery 
Dispute 6-7 (1966); and Park, supra note 13, at 101-103. 
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the pre-war peak of 1936. In this regard, it is interesting to note a 
remark by some Japanese observers: 
The natural outcome of the increase in the number of the 
fishing-boats and the decrease in the catch within the 
restrictive waters by the Orders of the Allied Powers, was for 
such vessels to operate beyond the "MacArthur Lines." 23 
This remark seems to indicate that even during the occupied 
period, some Japanese fishing vessels had admittedly violated the 
MacArthur Line. 
2. The Need for Reconciliation 
When the MacArthur Line was finally suspended in April 
1952, the need for fishery talks among the East Asian countries 
suddenly became serious. Similar circumstances occurred in the 
other parts of the oceans where the Japanese fishing interests 
were involved. In this regard, it was noted succinctly that "[t]he 
near approach of peace with Japan necessitates careful considera-
tion and prompt action with respect to Pacific Ocean Fisheries 
relations."24 
The political relations among the three coastal countries 
(Korea, Japan and China) were not ready to meet such newly 
emerging situations. The effect of these relations on fishing was 
evidenced soon by the intensification of the Chinese capture of the 
Japanese fishing vessels operating off its coasts25 and the Korean 
"Presidential Proclamation of Sovereignty over the Adjacent 
Sea." 
23. See Ohira and Kuwahara, supra note 22, at 110. 
24. See Bishop, "The Need for a Japanese Fisheries Agreement," 45 Am. J. 
lnt'l L. 712 (1951). 
25. The number of seized vessels and detained fishermen in December 1950-
July 1954 was illustrated as below: 
Vessels Crewmen Vessels 
Captured Detained Unreleased 
1950 5 54 5 
1951 55 671 54 
1952 46 541 32 
1953 24 311 13 
1954 28 329 
Total 158 1,909 104 
Source: Ohira and Kuwahara supra note 22 at 111. 
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3. Sino-Japanese Relations 
Since the establishment of the Communist Government on the 
mainland, Chinese leaders had adopted an anti-Japanese policy 
by which Japan was regarded as an imaginary enemy nation. 
This anti-Japanese policy was physically first shown by the 
Chinese seizure of Japanese fishing vessels on December 7, 1950. 
The seizures continued until August 1954, when the Sino-Japanese 
fisheries talks were advanced enough to conclude the first non-
governmental arrangement. 
Apart from the antagonistic policy issues between the two 
states, there were two additional grounds causing the fishery 
conflicts. As briefly shown above, the Chinese Government made 
many efforts to reorganize and modernize its fishing industry.26 
As a result, with the advancement of fishing equipment, vessels 
and skills, Chinese fishermen had begun to show increased 
interest in the coastal fisheries and they wanted other fishermen 
to stay off their coastal areas. On the other hand, Japan had 
regarded the Yell ow Sea and the East China Sea together as one 
of her eight coastal and offshore fishing grounds (map 3). 
Needless to say, the two fishing grounds are the most important 
areas to the Chinese. These were probably the most basic elements 
naturally causing the fishery troubles between the countries 
concerned. 
4. Korea-Japan Relations 
The main source of the dispute between the two states turned 
out to be the Korean Presidential Proclamation of Sovereignty 
over the Adjacent Sea, made on January 18, 1952, which appeared 
to be a "Korean version" of the Latin American claims to 
extensive maritime jurisdiction. The extent of the Proclamation 
ranged approximately 20 to 200 miles from the Korean coasts. 
First of all, Korea believed that the Proclamation was 
necessary for the preservation of peace. Its other purposes were 
claimed to ·be: (1) to regulate all natural resources over, on and 
beneath the continental shelf adjacent to Korean Peninsular and 
insular coasts of the National Territory; (2) to prevent, in 
particular, the exhaustible type of resources and natural wealth 
from being exploited to the disadvantage of inhabitants of Korea, 
26. For the efforts of the Chinese reed: et seq. QQvemment in this regard, see 
Survey of China Mainland Press (hereinafter referred to as SCMP) No. 1032, at 52 
et seq. (April 21-22, 1955). 
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or decreased or destroyed to the detriment of the country; and (3) 
to safeguard the principle of the non-interference with free 
navigation of the high seas.27 
Japan's Major Fishing Areas (Map 3) 
Okhotsk Sea 
• sa·~~ 
. 
! 
I 
I 
I 
.· 
East China 
Sea 1 
• 
Pacific 1 
Pacific 2 
Pacific 3 
Pacific 4 
-------- ----2'"~-----------· ----- .: J.O.N 
....... -- ---·----- -----•------- -- ______ _____., 
Source: Research Institute For Ocean Economics, 6 Data for Marine Industry 
Research No. 1, at 34 (1975). 
The most crucial issues in regard to the Proclamation seemed 
two.28 The first issue was whether there was so great a demand for 
such a unilateral measure. Since the Proclamation intended to 
27. For the full text of the Korean Declaration, see 2 U.N. Leg. Ser., Laws and 
Regulations on the Regime of the Territorial Sea 30-1 (1957); U.N. Doc. 
ST/LEG/SER.B/6, (1956). 
28. For the discussions of these issues, see the Korean Bar Association, "We 
Contend These: Concerning the Problem of Japanese Fishermen Who Violated Our 
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cover jurisdiction over the natural resources even over the 
continental shelf, it constructed a basis for Japan to argue that it 
constituted a violation of the freedom of the high seas fisheries, an 
established principle of international law. This was the weakest 
point of the Japanese-Korean dispute, but one which Korea could 
have defended. Thus Korea might have responded to it as follows: 
The development of the law of the sea at that time was at such a 
stage that even the International Law Commission recognized, in 
1951, that "the existing law on the conservation of the living 
resources of the high seas provided no adequate protection of 
marine fauna against waste or extermination."29 During the 
Japanese occupation of Korea, Korea suffered severe damage from 
the Japanese overfishing around its coasts; Korean coastal areas 
were very badly depleted by the Japanese trawlers. Thus fisheries 
in the areas were practically unproductive due to the destruction 
of bottom feeding grounds and sea grasses.30 Also, the right of 
fishing on the high seas cannot be exercised without any 
limitation. Its exercise is always accompanied by an obligation 
imposed by the principle prohibiting an abuse of right. In other 
words, any state enjoying the freedom of high seas fishing is 
bound to refrain from any acts which may adversely affect the use 
of the high seas by nationals of other states.31 In consideration of 
National Law," 4 Kor. J. Int'l L. No. 2, 136 (1959); the Japan Federation of Bar 
Association, We Appeal Again to the Lawyers of the World: Illegality of "Rhee 
Line" and Unlawful Arrest of Japanese Fishermen (1960); G. Weissberg, supra 
note 22, at 4 et seq.; Park, supra note 13, at 102-5. 
29. For details, see commentary to the Draft Articles of 1956 on the Law of the 
Sea by the International Law Commission, reprinted in S. Bayitch, International 
Law of Fisheries 87 (1957); For the development of fishery conservation in 1950's, 
see Bishop, "The 1958 Geneva Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the 
Living Resources of the High Seas," 62 Col. L. Rev. 1206, 1213-16 (1962); Kury, 
"The Fisheries Proposals: An Assessment," 12 San Diego L. Rev. 644, 650, 
particularly n.23 (1975). 
30. See H. Brittin, International Law for Sea-Going Officers 78-79 (1956). 
Quite recently, Korean fishermen on the east coast (the Sea of Japan) seriously 
complained of another gradual depletion of fishery resources by overfishing by 
.Japanese fishermen operating in the Joint Regulation Zone. For details, see Tong-
A llbo (Korean Daily), at 6 (Oct. 6, 1975); The Joong-ang Ilbo, at 7 (Nov. 7, 1975). 
31. Of course, from the principle of the freedom of the high seas, there have 
been several variations for various purposes, e.g., limitation of jurisdiction of, and 
policing by, the coastal state; defense; protection of neutrality rights; coastal 
navigation and commerce; customs inspection; protection against smuggling; 
public health control; regulation and protection of fisheries; and exploitation of 
subsoil riches. For further discussion on the variations, see T. Fulton, The 
Sovereignty of the Sea 651-52 (1911), and for some state practice on the matter, see 
P. Jessup, The Law of Territorial Waters and Maritime Jurisdiction 75-96 (1927). 
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the past experience with respect to Japanese overfishing and the 
understanding of the developmental stage of the law of the sea at 
that time, Korea could have justified its marine policy on the 
ground that the Proclamation of the "Peace (Rhee) Line" was an 
exercise of right to take some anticipatory measures for the 
prevention of another immediate possible overfishing by Japanese 
fishermen around its coasts. 
The second issue was whether the method and scope of the 
Proclamation were "appropriate," once the necessity for the 
Korean anticipatory measures was supposedly admitted. As to the 
question of method, it would no doubt have been more desirable to 
compromise the conflicting interests between the two countries, 
rather than to take a unilateral action by a nation. When Korea 
proposed to hold a fisheries talk in October 1951, Japan showed 
no positive reaction. Then Korea suggested an interim measure for 
recognizing the continued existence of some parts of the 
MacArthur Line until the time of reaching a new fisheries 
treaty.32 
When the Allied Powers started negotiations for the peace 
treaty with Japan, Korea, from the beginning, made strenuous 
efforts toward obtaining all possible assurances that its problems 
with Japan would gain fair treatment by the treaty. As a result, 
two articles are related, in part, to the Korean fisheries problems. 
Article 9 obliged Japan to negotiate with the Allied Powers so 
desiring for the conclusion of bilateral and multilateral fisheries 
agreements on the high seas. Article 21 provides: "Notwithstand-
ing the provisions of Article 25 of the present Treaty, China shall 
be entitled to the benefits of Article 10 and 14 (a)2; and Korea to 
the benefits of Articles 2, 4, 9 and 12 of the present Treaty." Also, 
Article 25 provides, in part, that: "For the purposes of the present 
Treaty, the Allied Powers shall be the States at war with Japan, 
or any State which previously formed a part of the territory of a 
State named in Article 23 . . . Subject to the provisions of Article 
21, the present Treaty shall not confer any rights, titles or benefits 
on any State which is not an Allied Power as herein defmed."33 In 
accordance with Article 25, Korea was not a party to the treaty, 
but by virtue of a proviso of the Article 21, Korea was conferred 
the right to enjoy the status of a third party beneficiary provided 
32. See, Byonggi Min, "The San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Korea-Japan 
Relations," Korean Quarterly, combined issue of No.4, Vol. 7 and No. 1, Vol. 9, at 
93 (1966-1967); Tong-A llbo (Korean Daily), July 28, 1951. 
33. See Allied Powers-Japan Treaty of Peace, reprinted in 46 Am. J. Int'l L. 
Supp. 71-86 (1952); 136 U.N.T.S. 45 (1953). 
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in Article 9. Thus Korea was entitled to demand as much right, 
title or interest in relation to Japan as the Allied Powers were 
entitled to as far as fishing interests, among other things, were 
concerned. 34 
On the one hand, Japan actually performed, regardless of the 
voluntariness of it performance, the relevant treaty obligations in 
relation to Canada and the United States by accepting the so-
called "principle of abstention."35 On the other hand, in relation to 
Korea, Japan was not as faithful to its pertinent obligation of the 
Treaty; she also raised technical objections to some parts of the 
substantial Korean proposals for fishery talks. 36 
In addition to those pending political and legal considera-
tions, Korea was seriously faced with maritime security problems 
during the period of 1950-1953 when it was involved in the 
conflict with the northern part of its Peninsula. Under such 
stalemate circumstances, the method taken unilaterally by Korea 
might be possibly understood in terms of urging the other party to 
observe the international minimum standard for conservation of 
marine resources, thus preventing another threat of extermination 
of fishery stocks, and securing the war-time safety around Korean 
coasts. There remained, however, room for arguing whether the 
scope of the Proclamation was acceptible to the community of 
nations in light of international law of the time. From Korea's 
viewpoint, there was no doubt that some sort of conservation 
measures should be taken under those circumstances. But it was 
also conceivable that Korea might have had a much better chance 
of obtaining "universal acceptance" from the majority of nations 
if it had more seriously considered the maximum limit of the Line. 
Finally, as a practical matter, the ability of the Korean police 
patrol ships was not sufficient to enforce the whole Proclamation 
area.37 As a result, even in practical sense of national interest, it 
did not appear that the Proclamation had served its national 
benefits as much as had been intended. 
34. AB regard the status of Korea in relation to the Treaty, see J. Dulles, 
"Records of Proceedings, Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the 
Treaty of Peace with Japan", U.S. State of Dept's Pub. No. 4392, at 84-5 (1951); W. 
Bishop, International Law, Cases and Materials 146 (1971). 
35. See International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North 
Pacific Ocean, 205 U.N.T.S. No. 2770, 80 (1955). 
36. Korea probably regarded it as one of the Japanese precedents showing that 
Japan tends to possess stronger attitudes toward the weak, and weaker attitudes 
toward the strong. 
37. In 1952 when the Peace Line was proclaimed, Korean patrol ships could 
seize only ten Japanese fishing vessels with 132 fishermen, while as many as 2,400 
16 CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STuDIES SERIES 
It may be noted, by the way, that since the Korean-Japan 
Fisheries Agreement of 1965, the issue about the validity of the 
Peace Line has in a practical sense been dead, even though the 
Korean Government has never officially suspended it, since the 
Line was tacitly modified by the Joint Regulation Zone and the 
Joint Fishery Resources Survey Zone in accordance with the 
Agreement without regard to its validity.38 
D. Attitude Toward Coastal Jurisdiction 
China and Japan have adhered to different practices with 
respect to coastal jurisdiction. 39 The practices in fact reflect the 
differently emerging national interests of each state. In general, 
the contracting states' views on the coastal jurisdiction determine 
the character of fisheries agreements. It seems therefore useful to 
describe briefly, among other things, the historical background of 
the adoption of each country's policies with respect to the 
territorial sea limit and their current views on the issue. 
1. China 
China has utilized the law of the sea for over a century in 
order to secure its maritime zones by obliging other states to 
refrain from unwanted military action in whatever coastal waters 
can legitimately be claimed as Chinese.40 In 1930, long before 
vessels with 38,000 fishermen were estimated to be operating within the Line. For 
detailed statistics see Park supra note 13, at 103 and Korean Government, 
Commentary on the Treaties and Conventions between Korea and Japan 47, 56 
(1965). 
38. For details, see infra text accompanying notes 143-49. 
39. See Park, "Continental Shelf Issues in the Yellow Sea and the East China 
Sea," (Occasional Paper 15, Law of the Sea Inst., U. of R. I., 1972); Park, "Oil 
Under Troubled Waters: The Northeast Asia Sea-Bed Controversy," 14 Harv.Int'l 
L. J. 212 (1973); Mitchel, "The Legal Status of the Continental Shelf of the East 
China Sea," 51 Oreg. L. R. 789 (1972); Goldie, "The International Court of Justice's 
'Natural Prolongation' and the Continental Shelf Problems of Island," 4 Neth. 
Y.B. Int'l L. 237 (1973); Note, "International Law and the Sino-Japanese 
Controversy over Territorial Sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands," 52 Boston L. 
Rev. 763 (1972); Cheng, "The Sino-Japanese Dispute Over the Tiao-yu-t'ai 
(Senkaku) Islands and the Law of the Territorial Acquisition," 14 Vir. J. Int'l L. 
221 (1974); Park, "The Sino-Japan-Korean Sea Resources Controversy and the 
Hypothesis of a 200-Mile Economic Zone," Harv. lnt'l L. J. 44 (1975); Chiu, "China 
and the Question of Territorial Sea," 1 Int'l Trade L. J. 29 (1975); Chiu, "Chinese 
Attitude Toward Continental Shelf and Its Implication on Delimiting Seabed in 
Southeast Asia," Occasional Papers! Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian 
studies (Univ. of Md. Law School), No. 1 (1977). 
40. See 1 J. Cohen and H. Chiu, People's China and lnt'l L. 467 (1974). It is 
interesting to note that the Chinese concept of coastal jurisdiction seemed to be 
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China was split into the People's Republic and the Republic of 
China (Taiwan), China claimed a three-mile territorial sea. Since 
then, Taiwan has never changed its policy of the breadth of the 
territorial sea. Following the establishment of the PRC on the 
mainland, in October 1949, the Chinese territorial sea limit was 
not made public until September 1958, when China issued the 
Declaration on the Territorial Sea, which reads in summary as 
follows: 
(1) The breadth of the territorial sea of the People's Republic 
of China shall be twelve nautical miles (1 nautical mile = 
1.852 kilometers); (2) the straight baseline method shall be 
adopted to delimit the breadth of the territorial sea; (3) 
Taiwan and its surrounding islands, the Penghue, the 
Tungsha, the Chungsha, the N ausha Island and all other 
islands shall belong to China; (4) the water areas inside the 
baseline, including the Pohai Bay and Chiung Chow Straits, 
are Chinese inland waters.41 
From the Chinese point of view, this Declaration was an 
important measure for national security and economic interests. 
China suggested three reasons for the Declaration: (1) under 
international law every nation has the right to extend its 
territorial sea up to twelve miles; (2) each nation is free to 
determine its territorial limits, since there is no universally 
recognized breadth of the territorial sea; and (3) the three-mile 
limit of the territorial sea has long become obsolete. 42 
As far as the numerical extension of the twelve-mile limit is 
concerned, it seems useless at this moment to discuss the pros and 
cons of the Chinese justification, since a majority of nations have 
already claimed or shown their willingness to support the twelve-
mile limit.43 It does not, however, necessarily mean that state 
expressed in terms of "whatever coastal waters can legitimately be claimed as 
Chinese." Cf. infra, text accompanying notes 52-54, 69-71. 
41. "Declaration of the Chinese Government on China's Territorial Sea," 
NCNA-English, Peking (Sept. 4, 1958), in SCMP No. 1849; Peking Review 21 (Sept. 
9, 1958); U.S. Dep't of State, Int'l Boundary Studies, Series A. No. 43, Limits in the 
Seas, Straight Baselines of People's Republic of China (1972). 
42. For a discussion of these three conventions, see Editorial Comments, 
"Chinese Views on the Law of the Sea: Selected Aspects," 12 Indian J. Int'l L. 607-
9 (1972). 
43. For the current data relating to the number of states claiming each 
specified breadths of territorial waters, see the latest revision of "National Claims 
to Maritime Jurisdictions," U.S. Dep't Of State, Limits in the Seas series (No. 36). 
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practice and theory have not been diversified on the question 
whether a twelve-mile breadth is sanctioned by customary 
international law.44 
What is most controversial at this juncture is the method of 
drawing the straight base line and limiting inland waters. The 
Chinese base line was drawn by the straight lines connecting 
base-points on the mainland coast and on the outermost of the 
coastal islands. Thus the water area extending twelve nautical 
miles outward from this base line is China's territorial sea, and 
the areas inside the base line are inland waters. 
It may be said that the drawing of the base line and thus the 
setting of the boundaries of internal and territorial waters are 
primarily a function of combined geographical and predisposi-
tional factors. 45 But the geographical factor has generally been 
given more weight than the dispositional factor. Chinese coasts 
are, of course, so irregular and indented that, on the mainland 
alone, they run to almost 11,000 kilometers (km). Along its coastal 
and offshore areas are found 3,416 islands, over two-thirds of 
them in the coastal waters of the East China Sea. It might also be 
true that the food supply for the Chinese coastal inhabitants had, 
in some measure, depended on the coastal fisheries in the past. 
Furthermore, it might be recognized that the future anticipated 
dependence of the coastal inhabitants' nutrition on the coastal 
fisheries is likely to increase conspicuously. In spite of all of these 
factors, it would not be easy to determine whether these Chinese 
geographical and predispositional factors along the entire coastal 
line would constitute a special circumstances in which such a 
deviation could be justified.46 
In some places like the southern section where the coastline is 
deeply indented or dotted with a fringe of islands (map 4, infra), 
According to it, 29 states claim three miles, 52 states twelve miles, and 9 states 200 
miles. 
44. See McDougal and Burke, "The Community Interest in a Narrow 
Territorial Sea: Inclusive versus Exclusive Competence over the Oceans," 45 
Cornell L. Q. 171 (1960); Oda, "The Extent of the Territorial Sea: Some Analysis of 
the Geneva Conferences and Recent Developments," 6 Jap. Ann. Int'l L. 7 (1962); 
Freeman, "Possible Solutions to the 200-Mile Territorial Limit," 7 Int'l Lawyer 
387 (1973); G. Knight, The Law of the Sea: Cases, Documents, and Readings 329 
(1975-76 ed.). 
45. M. McDougal and W. Burke, The Public Order of the Oceans 306 (1962). 
46. For the affirmative answers, see Cheng, supra note 11, at 58; for negative 
answers, see the reactions of the United States and Great Britain, found in the U.S. 
Dep't of State, For. Policy: Current Documents 1198 (1958) and The Time at 6 (Sept. 
6, 1958) respectively. 
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the method of straight baselines may be accepted with the 
possible exception of a dispute as to the proper length of the 
straight base line.47 In some other places, such as the northern 
parts where the coasts are straight, or gently rounded, the 
adoption of straight base lines may not be reasonable. In the 
Chinese coastline, therefore, it seems suitable to employ the 
method of mixed base lines, i.e., drawing the base line in tum by 
the methods of low-water line and straight base line to suit 
different conditions.4B 
As to the claim that its bays and straits are internal waters, 
China seemed not to pay much attention to the existing law of 
nations.49 Some Chinese bays may involve the problems of 
definition, distance of a closing line, methods of drawing a 
straight base line, the status of islands at the mouth of a bay, 
etc. 5° According to the Chinese claim, those problems did not arise 
since the whole water area inside the straight base line is to be 
regarded as internal waters. Furthermore, China also maintained 
that Pohai Bay was a "historic bay."51 
The basic Chinese position on the limit of territorial sea taken 
in the Declaration of 1958 was reiterated in China's first address 
at the U.N. Sea-Bed Committee on March 3, 1972,52 and it was 
confirmed at the "Caracas Conference."53 
The Chinese policy on the coastal jurisdiction, which can be 
decided by the coastal state subject to the requirements of 
reasonableness and necessity, has been unchanged from the 
beginning. Thus it seems consistently short of the noble 
4 7. See Articles 3, 4(1) and (4) of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea 
and the Contiguous Zone; the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, [1951] I.C.J. Rep. 
128-134. 
48. For mixed baseline, see Art. 6(2) of Part II of the Informal Single 
Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP.8/Part II at 6 (1975). This 
paragraph of the article was proposed by China. 
49. See Art. 7(1)-(5) of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the 
Contiguous Zone. 
50. See Hurst, "The Territoriality of Bays," 3 Brit. lnt'l L. 42 (1922-23); for the 
explanation of the specific bays around the world, P. Jessup, supra note 31; at 373-
439; Shalowitz, "The Concept of a Bay as Inland Waters," 13 Surveying and 
Mapping 432 (1953); L. Bouchez, The Regime of Bays in International Law 16-26, 
especially 97-98 (1964); Hodgson and Alexander, Towards and Objective Analysis 
of Special Circumstances (Law of the Sea Inst., Occasional Paper no. 13) 3-22 
(1972). 
51. For Chinese claim over historic bay, see Cheng, supra note 11, at 61, 
particularly nn.75, 76. 
52. U.N. Doc. AI AC.138/SR.72 (1972); 11 lnt.l Legal Mats. 654 (1972). 
53. For details, see U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/SR.25, at 6 (1974). 
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understanding that the delimitation of sea area always has 
international aspects, and should be acceptable to the majority of 
nations.54 
2. Japan 
As soon as Japan's door was opened to the Western states by 
the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace and Amity (Perry's Treaty) 
with the United States in 1854,55 Japan encountered the problem 
of defining the breadth of the territorial waters. When the 
Crimean War extended to the seas of the Far East, the belligerent 
states made clear their intention not to engage in hostilities 
within the range of a cannon shot from the Japanese coasts.56 
Thus Japan was in some measure acquainted with the necessity 
for adopting the Western concept of the breadth of the territorial 
sea to observe the rule of neutrality under international law in 
time of war. It was not, however, until 1870 that Japan adopted 
the three-mile limit of the territorial sea, when it was again 
involved in the problem of neutrality at the outbreak of the 
Franco-Prussiari War (1870-71).57 In order to adjust itself to these 
new circumstances, the Meiji Government, after some trial and 
errors, on August 29, 1870, finally enacted Neutrality Regulations 
and issued a Proclamation of Neutrality containing a policy of the 
breadth of the territorial sea, by providing in Article 1 that: 
The contending parties are not permitted to engage in 
hostilities in Japanese harbours or inland waters, or within a 
distance of three ri from land at any place, being the distance 
to which a cannon-ball can be thrown. Men-of-war or 
merchant vessels will, however, be allowed free passage as 
heretofore. sa 
This policy of narrowing the limit of territorial sea to three 
miles was in accord with the Japanese national interest in 
54. See the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Cases, supra note 47 at 132. 
55. For the general background, see 1 P. Treat, Diplomatic Relations between 
the United States and Japan 1853-95 (1932); for the text of the Treaty, see 6 H. 
Miller, Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America, 
Documents 152-172: 1852-55, 439 et seq. (1942). 
56. See "Neutrality" [Non-Intervention], found in Kozai's unpublished paper 
on Breadth of the Territorial Sea. 
57. 3 Dai Nippon Ciaiko Bunsho (Diplomatic Documents of the Great Japan) 
12, found in id. 
58. 1 F. Deak and P. Jessup, A Collection of Neutrality Laws, Regulations and 
Treaties of Various Countries 736-7 (1939). 
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obtaining more food and other raw materials from the oceans 
than any other country.59 
Beginning in 1973, the major Japanese ocean policies vividly 
began to be challenged by the new trends in the law of the sea. 
The first Japanese response appeared, in March 1973, at Sub-
Committee II of the U.N. Sea-Bed Committee indicating that "it 
would consider the issue of a twelve-mile territorial sea to be of 
second importance compared with the other related problems of 
areas adjacent to the territorial sea." This position became more 
dermite at the "Caracas Conference" on the Law of the Sea. 60 
Quite recently, on March 30, 1977, the Japanese Government 
announced that it would expand its three-mile territorial sea limits 
to twelve miles and that it also would adopt a 200-mile exclusive 
fishing zone.61 
III. STRUCTURE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ARRANGEMENTS 
The non-governmental fisheries arrangements usually con-
sisted of a main text, four to five appendices, two memoranda, and 
two exchanges of letters.62 The main features of the arrangements 
were to place an emphasis on the safety regulation of fishing 
operations and on the establishment of various regulated (fishing 
or security) zones. Throughout the treaty period, China had 
enforced strict regulation of the military zones, and fishing zones 
in general had remained unchanged with slight expansion.63 
Enforcement measures were based on flag state jurisdiction in 
relation to trawl fishing and on mutual jurisdiction in relation to 
seine fishing. But this jurisdiction was not strong enough to 
control violations. The provision for dispute settlement was not 
well framed and thus there was no way for solving disputes in 
case each party had a different view on the matter. Free 
navigation in the fishing zones was at all times safeguarded. 
59. For details, see Nihon Keizai Shinbun (a Japanese Language Economic 
Daily), at 9 (Sept. 17, 1974); for general statement in this regard, see U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.62/SR.44, at 12 (1974). 
60. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/SR.41, at 13 (1974). 
61. See Tong-A Ilbo (a Korean Daily) at 1 (March 30, 1977); The New York 
Times at A 5 (March 30, 1977). 
62. For the text of the first arrangement of 1955, see B. MacChesney, 51 
International Law Situation and Documents 1956: Situation, Documents and 
Commentary on Recent Developments in the International Law of the Sea 368-70 
(1957); and for its appendixes, exchange of letters and memoranda, see 2 Korea J. 
Int'l L. 150-159 (1957). For the text and its attached documents of the third 
arrangement of 1965, see SCMP, No. 3613, 27-42 (January 10, 1966). 
63. For expansion, see map 4 infra. 
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The arrangements were, in form, non-governmental and 
provisional but, in function and operation, were comparable to a 
formal treaty or standing agreement.64 The forms and the 
substance of the non-governmental and governmental fisheries 
agreements are quite similar. At this point, therefore, the chief 
components of the non-governmental arrangements will be 
described, with discussions limited to a few legal issues which do 
not coincide with those of the governmental agreement, in order to 
64. For the problems concerning the negotiations of the first fisheries 
agreement, see Ohira and Kuwahara supra note 22, at 109-25 (1959); for 
discussions on the non-governmental arrangements, see Park supra note 13, at 110-
-22; for the non-governmental fisheries talks, see the following table: 
Evolution of the Non-Governmental Arrangements 
Conferences Date 
1st 06~13-55 
2nd 06-13-56 
3rd 
4th 
5th 
6th 
7th 
8th 
06-13-57 
06-13-58 
01-04-63 
12-23-63 
12-23-65 
12-23-67 
12-23-68 
12-23-69 
06-23-70 
12-31-70 
06-23-72 
06-23-73 
06-24-74 
06-22-75 
Place 
Peking 
By exchange 
of notes 
Peking 
" 
By exchange 
of notes 
" 
" 
Peking 
" 
By exchange 
of notes 
Peking 
Effective 
Period 
One year 
One year-
renewed 
" 
Invalid 
Agreed to 
hold a talk 
by the end 
of the year. 
Two years 
Two years-
renewed 
One year-
renewed 
" 
Six months-
renewed 
Two years-
renewed 
One and a 
half years 
One year-
renewed 
" 
" 
Expired 
Regulating 
Fisheries 
Trawl fishing 
" 
Trawl fishing 
" 
" 
Seine fishing 
Trawl and seine 
fishing 
" 
" 
Source: Hae-woe Soo-san Jung-bo (Overseas Fisheries Information, a 
Korean Fisheries Monthly) 49 (Jan. 1975). 
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avoid overlapping discussion in the following sections IV and, in 
part, V. 
A. Fishing Zones 
As regards the delimiting of fishing grounds, the original 
Chinese idea was to create three areas. The area west of the 124th 
eastern longitude would be designated for the Chinese fishermen 
only; that east of the !25th for the Japanese fishennen exclu-
sively; and the buffer zone between the 124th and 125th eastern 
longitude for joint controls. Japan opposed the idea because it 
excluded the Japanese fishermen from large high seas areas (the 
longest distance from the Chinese coasts ranges about 150 miles) 
and it would have weakened the Japanese position in fisheries 
relations with other countries. In order to compromise the 
conflicting interests, Japan and China agreed that the fishing 
vessels of both sides might operate at the same time, but the 
fishing areas were to be divided into small areas and the fishing 
period was to be short and the number as well as, in some cases, 
the horsepower and luring lights of fishing vessels were to be 
limited. In allocating the areas, a particular consideration was 
given to protecting the special interest of China existing solely by 
reason of geographical adjacency. In addition, certain waters were 
to be closed to all fishing for security reasons.65 Yet the Japanese 
gained considerable benefit from the allocation since the final 
lines were more advantageous to them than those under either the 
original Chinese proposal or the later governmental agreement. 
Trawling Operations. Six principal trawl fishing zones 
were established (map 4). Each fishing zone was specifically 
regulated by way of limiting the maximum number of trawlers 
and the fishing period. 
A memorandum also delineated a fishing area (memorandum 
zone) densely inhabited by fish and located in the central part of 
the Yellow Sea (map 4). In order to prevent a serious decline in 
fishery productivity, the number of trawlers there was limited to 
eighty during the four months of October, November, January, 
and February. This zone was established by a Chinese unilateral 
suggestion in a form of memorandum. Nevertheless, the Japanese 
Association unreluctantly accepted it by merely pointing out that 
it would be in the mutual interest to preserve fishery production.ss 
65. For details, see infra, text accompanying notes 191-92, 209. 
66. See Article 1 of the main text and appendix 1 of three non-governmental 
arrangements. 
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The Sino-Japanese Non-Governmental Fisheries Arrangements 
(Map 4) 
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By means of an exchange of letters, an area (the trawl fishing 
prohibited zone) was designated wherein trawl fishing would be 
prohibited (map 4).67 This created a source of potential difficulty 
since it was not an area covered by the non-governmental 
arrangements but in fact was an area excluded from the 
arrangements by a Chinese domestic law. It was a provisional 
conservation measure subject to alteration by general provisions 
to be made by the respective govemments.68 By establishing the 
zone, the Chinese view turned ou..t to be similar to that of Russians. 
Each declared that a coastal state should establish its own regime 
over its neighboring waters in accordance with the need to protect 
the economic interests of the nation69 and that a state's 
conservation measures belong to its domestic affairs and do not 
require the concurrence of another state.70 In this case also, the 
Japanese were not daring enough to reject the Chinese unilateral 
action on the ground that it encroached upon freedom of the high 
seas. 71 As a result, all Japanese and Chinese trawlers were 
prohibited from conducting operations throughout the year in the 
conservation zone. 
Moreover, trawlers were required to observe the other 
conservation measures, in terms of restrictions on the sizes of 
young fish and net, and on the amount offish catches.72 Trawlers 
also had to observe a vague rule which stated that "trawlers must 
move to another fishing ground when they meet concentrations of 
young fish." However, the rule was not explicit as to the degree of 
concentration of young fish. Therefore, it was not clear from the 
provision how trawlers had to abide by the rule. From the point of 
view of enforcement measures, this rule seemed meaningless since 
67. See the memoranda exchanged by the Fisheries Association of both sides 
on December 17, 1965, attached to the third non·govemmental arrangement .. 
68. It was drawn by the Fisheries Management Bureau of the East China 
Military Administration Committee on December 16, 1956. 
69. In March 1956, the Soviet Union proclaimed the "Bulganin Line" whereby 
provisional conservation measures were adopted to limit the fishing zone, to 
designate the annual maximum amount of catches, closed seasons for fishing and 
fishing instruments, and to stipulate a penal provision for the violation of these 
regulations. For further discussion, see Ohira, "Fishery Problems Between Soviet 
Russia and Japan," 2 Jap. Ann. Int'l L. 10-13, particularly 9 (1958). 
70. S. Oda, Kaiyono Kokusaiho Kozo (Structure of the Law of the Sea), 129 
(1956). 
71. See Letters exchanged in connection with the third non·govemmental 
arrangement. 
72. In the first and second non·govemmental arrangements, there was no 
provision regulating the size of the mesh of trawl nets and the size of young fish. 
The third arrangement first dealt with the conservation of young fish. 
, 
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the non-governmental arrangements did not provide for an 
enforcing agency. 73 
Seining Operations. The seine fishing arrangement of 
197074 was, in form, a supplement to the existing third arrange-
ment, but it was a separate and unique agreement in terms of 
function and substance. It designated three seine fishing areas 
(areas A, B, and C on map 4). Conservation measures for seiners 
were more restrictive than those for trawlers. In addition to the 
orthodox regulations concerning the number of vessels, areas and 
seasons75 as well as concerning the sizes of young fish and nets,76 
seiners had to observe regulations relating to horsepower and 
luring lights of vessels. The maximum capacity of the main 
engine of each seiner was limited to 660 horsepower, and the 
maximum luminosity of the lights for luring fish was restricted to 
10,000 candles. Each team of seiners operating with lighting ships 
was allowed two such ships. 
B. Regulation of Safe Fishing Operations 
The provisions for maintaining orderly fishing operations 
were explicitly expressed in each arrangement. These may be 
noted since the Japanese gave their own implied significance to 
the meaning of the safety regulations by interpreting them to 
mean that the regulation made their vessels secure from seizure. 
Trawling Operations. Trawlers were obliged to observe 
two kinds of safety regulations: (1) the treaty regulations 
stipulated by the non-governmental arrangements, and (2) the 
international navigational rules recognized by their govern-
73. See Clause 1 of the seine fishing arrangement; for discussion on 
enforcement measures, see infra, text accompanying notes 81-91. 
74. For the text, see SCMP, No. 4811, 234-39 (Jan. 4-8, 1971). 
75. On June 21, 1972 when the arrangement was first renewed, the number of 
Japanese vessels was increased to eighty (sixteen teams). And the numbers 
remained equal after the increase of June 21, 1972. For details, Clause 1 of the 
seine fishing arrangements. 
76. Fish smaller than those stipulated were supposed to be landed in excess of 
15% of a haul. Otherwise, the haul was requested to be promptly put back into the 
sea and fishermen should move to another fishing ground. It was not, however, 
explicit as to whether "fifteen percent of a haul" meant a haul from the same 
species or from any kind of species. With regard to this question, the provision of 
the trawl fishing arrangement left no doubt by describing a haul from the "same" 
species. 
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ments. 77 It was not known what rules of the international 
navigation were accepted by each government. On that question, 
China seemed especially selective, advocating or renouncing some 
principles of international law when such action inured to her 
benefit. At the "Geneva Session" of the Third Conference on the 
Law of the Sea in May 1975, the Chinese attitudes toward the 
principles of international law were, in part, elucidated by her 
delegate stating that: 
His delegation disagreed with the general and indiscriminate 
references to ... the rules of international law. Many of 
those rules had been established before the majority of 
developing countries became independent and did not 
conform with their interests. The world had changed, and 
developing countries could not be asked to accept out-of-date 
hiws. 78 
The other treaty rules that trawlers were required to observe 
were safety regulations concerning methods of marking vessels, 
giving signals, fishing operations and making way for each 
other.79 
Seining Operations. The safety regulations of seiners were 
simpler than those of trawlers. Seiners also were required to 
observe two kinds of safety regulations: (1) the treaty rules 
stipulated by this seine fishing arrangement and (2) the interna-
tional navigational practice. The present treaty rules dealt with 
methods of markings and rules for fishing operations. The ways 
for using of luring lights were especially stipulated in terms of a 
distance measured between one vessel and the other.80 As far as 
the international navigational rules were concerned, however, 
seiners were required to abide by more broad regulations since 
they had to observe all the international navigational rules, 
regardless of their being recognized by the Contracting States 
respectively. 
77. In regard to the international navigational rules, the first and second 
arrangements required compliance with all the international rules, while the third 
one required only compliance with certain rules recognized by their governments. 
Compare appendix 2 of the first arrangement with appendix 3 of the third 
arrangement. 
78. See U.N. Doc. 62/C.3/SR.21, at 10 (1975). 
79. For details, see Clause I-IV of the appendix 3 of the third arrangement. 
80. See Clause (1) and (2) of the seine fishing arrangement. 
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C. Enforcement Mea.suYes 
There were two different enforcement methods for trawlers 
and seiners. 
Trawling Operations. Enforcement measures of the first 
and second arrangements were identical to each other. Therefore, 
further discussion will be based on the first and third arrange-
ments. The first arrangement envisaged three categories: (1) 
infractions of the number of vessels and the limit of the fishing 
zones; (2) disputes between trawlers of the two parties; and (3) 
damage inflicted on the vessels in violation of safety regulations. 
The third arrangement regulated violation of the size of catchable 
young fish, in addition to the first and third categories under the 
first arrangement. 
In the event of violation of regulations concerning the number 
of vessels and the limit of fishing zones, any trawlers, when the 
infraction was discovered, were obliged to report the violation to 
the Fisheries Association of the foreign vessel through their own 
Fisheries Association. In other words, there was no official 
inspection agency. Each Fisheries Association was responsible 
only for taking action against violation by its own vessels upon 
receipt of such a report. Sanctions against violation under the first 
arrangement were warning or punishment, but they were not 
specified later in the third arrangement. The only obligation of the 
Fisheries Association under the latter arrangement was to take 
prompt, effective and proper action.81 Of course, no provision was 
made as to what actions ought to be considered "prompt, effective 
and proper." 
The disputes between the vessels of the two parties were dealt 
with only by the first arrangement. The disputes were to be settled 
by mutual discussion or decision reached on the spot. This unique 
method of dispute settlement seemed an oriental form of a 
gentleman's agreement, which might have been conceived in a 
thought of emphasizing courtesy. If the disputes could not be 
solved in either way, both Fisheries Associations were obliged to 
take mutual action to settle them after investigating the actual 
situation. 82 
In the event of collision or damage to the vessels due to non-
observance of operational safety rules, under the third arrange-
ment the trawlers involved were to take prompt steps to safeguard 
81. Art. 7(1), id. and Art. 6(1) of the first arrangement. 
82. Art. 6(2) of the first arrangement. 
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the damaged vessels and, whenever possible, they had to consult 
the other vessels on the spot and to exchange written statements. 
The first arrangement imposed only an obligation to report the 
incident to the respective Fisheries Associations.83 As shown 
earlier, in case of trawlers, in order to avoid collision due to fault 
or negligence in observing international navigational rules, the 
first arrangement required vessels to observe all the international 
navigational rules without limitation, but the third arrangement 
obligated them to abide by only some of the rules recognized by 
their own governments. As a result, it is assumed that if the 
collision happened due to a violation of the international rules 
recognized by the Government of the violating vessel, the vessel 
would be liable for any damage arising therefrom in accordance 
with the rules. 84 But the solution of any matters of collision 
according to the normal procedures of litigations, if the rules 
recognized by China and Japan were different from each other, 
would be much more problematical. Likewise, if the collisions 
occurred without relation to the international navigation rules, 
the non-governmental arrangements provided no guidelines for 
assessment of damages. 
In regard to trawlers' violation of conservation measures 
concerning young fish, a "quasi-port state jurisdiction" was 
conferred to implement such regulation. 85 This was not complete 
exclusive port state jurisdiction, but it did seem that such a 
provision might be most effective in implementing the enforce-
ment measures under the non-governmental arrangements. The 
effectiveness of this jurisdiction arose from the fact that the 
Fisheries Association of the state in which the port was located 
had been authorized to send special personnel to discover any 
possible violation, in the event the suspected vessels entered the 
port. Even if any infraction was found in the port, however, the 
Association had no authority to prosecute or punish it. Instead, 
the Association had to report it to the other Association, to which 
the violating vessels belonged. 
The non-governmental arrangements provided for negotia-
tions as a final stage of dispute settlement. In case of failure of 
negotiations, the settlement of the dispute was entirely in the 
hands of the Fisheries Association of the flag state. All the other 
83. Art. 6(3), id. and Art. 7(2} of the third arrangement. 
84. For the rule of dividing damages, see Arts. 1-5 of the International 
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Collisions between 
Vessels, signed at Brussels, Sept. 23, 1910. 
85. Clauses (1}-(4) of the appendix 2 of the third arrangement. 
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party could expect in that regard was that the Fisheries 
Association of the flag state would take action in good faith. 
Seining Operations. The seine fishing arrangement did 
not have provisions for enforcement measures in case of 
violations of conservation measures and collision problems due to 
non-observance of international navigation rules. It was assumed, 
however, that violations of conservation measures would be 
disciplined in conformity with provisions for trawlers since the 
seining arrangement was a supplement to the third trawling 
arrangement. Moreover, it seems unquestionable that the collision 
problems due to violation of international rules would be solved in 
accordance with international practices since seiners were 
required to observe all the international navigational rules. 
In general, the seining arrangement provided stronger 
enforcement measures than those envisaged by any other 
arrangements and even by the later governmental agreement. 
Both Fisheries Associations were obliged to take measures for 
supervising their seiners. The primary responsibility for enforcing 
regulations, therefore, was placed on the two Associations. 
Inspection agencies were ordinary seiners and four inspection 
ships appointed by the two Associations (each Association 
appointed two ships). Each Inspection Ship was required to be 
conspicuously marked as "Inspection Ship" on the outer walls of 
the vessel and had to carry three inspectors with certificates 
approved by each Association. The two Associations had to notify 
each other in advance of the types, horsepower, etc. of the 
Inspection Ships and the lists of inspectors. 86 As a result, the 
function of and responsibility for enforcing rules seemed to be 
mutually divided very well between the two parties. 
At this moment, in order to have a better understanding of the 
enforcement tools, the present arrangement is briefly compared to 
the 1882 North Sea Fisheries Convention.87 Both were the first 
86. Compare infra, text accompanying notes 164-75. 
87. Articles 28-34 of the 1882 Convention elaborated the general principle of 
mutual enforcement. The Convention was signed at Hague, May 6, 1882, and 
entered into force May 14, 1884. The contracting parties were Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Effective in May, 
1964, Great Britain withdrew from the Convention for the reason of establishing a 
larger exclusive fishery zone than the three·mile limit accepted in the 1882 
Convention. A new conference met in 1963 and 1964 in London and it adopted the 
European Fisheries Convention of 1964, which was primarily concerned with 
exclusive fishery zones. For the text of the North Sea Fisheries Convention of 1882, 
see I U.N. Legislative Series, Laws and Regulations on the Regime of the High 
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agreements for a mutual enforcement system in the respective 
regions- in the East Asian Seas and the North Sea. In the event 
infractions by foreign vessels were found in the East Asian Seas, 
the Inspection Ships were entitled only to demand a written 
statement from the vessel concerned and then were to report the 
incident to their own Fisheries Association. The Association 
receiving the report had to notify the other Fisheries Association 
of the offence. In contrast, in the event of an infraction of the 
North Sea regulations, the patrol vessels of any signatory nations 
were empowered not only to authenticate all infractions of the 
regulations but also to seize the offending vessels of other 
nationalities, if serious infractions occurred.88 The Japanese or 
Chinese inspector was not allowed to go on board a fishing vessel 
of the other side for any purpose. As a result, even if the inspector 
had reasonable cause to believe that a violation had occurred, he 
was not competent to inquire into the suspected violation. In 
contrast, commanders of the North Sea cruisers, under the same 
circumstances, might require the master of the vessel to exhibit 
the official document establishing her nationality. Commanders 
could board and search the vessel if necessary to obtain proof of 
an offence. Furthermore, in similar cases under most other 
fisheries conventions, inspectors have the power to investigate the 
conduct of fishing vessels prior to the discovery of an infraction. 
In regard to sanctions, both the present arrangement and the 
North Sea Convention left the prosecution and punishment of 
offenses in the hands of the flag state. 89 According to the present 
arrangement, no physical imprisonment was imposed on the 
persons in charge of the vessels. The punishments were only 
warnings, a fine or disqualification of the vessel's operator. In 
contrast, under the North Sea Convention, either fine or 
imprisonment, or both, had to be imposed in accordance with the 
domestic laws of each contracting state.9o 
The North Sea Convention of 1882 was a multinational 
convention reached under circumstances91 showing the percepti-
Seas 179, ST/LEG/SER.B/1 (1951). For the text of the European Fisheries 
Convention of 1964, see 3 Int'l L. M. 476 (1964). 
88. See Arts. 28, 29, and 30 of the third arrangement. 
89. Clause six(2) of the seine fishing arrangement; Arts. 34-35 of the North 
Sea Fisheries Convention. 
90. Id. For local punitive measures of each contracting party, see U.N. 
Legislative Series, supra note 87 at 185-95. 
91. For the fisheries circumstances of the North Sea toward the close of the 
century, see Stevenson, "International Regulations of the Fisheries on the High 
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ble decline of certain fish and inadequate fisheries regulation in 
the region. Yet it was intended only to keep order and to protect 
fishermen and their applicances, and not as a conservation 
measure. It seemed natural, therefore, that the North Sea 
Convention was more restrictive than the non-governmental 
arrangement. 
D. Emergency Rescue 
Generally, the scope of the emergency rescue and mooring 
provisions of the Sino-Japanese arrangements included (1) marine 
disaster; (2) other irresistible calamities; (3) a serious injury to, or 
critical illness of, the crew on board the fishing vessels; and (4) the 
need for emergency shelter or assistance.92 
In the first arrangement, there was no limit on the maximum 
number of Japanese fishing vessels to be allowed simultaneous 
emergency moorings at the designated ports of China. Such a 
limit appeared in the second and third arrangements, i.e., fixing 
the maximum number of vessels to fifty overall and to thirty at 
each port. However, there were no restrictions on the number of 
Chinese fishing vessels permitted emergency mooring under the 
listed circumstances in any Japanese ports. Such different 
treatments by Japan and China, however, were understandable 
since Chinese fishermen seldom fished near the Japanese coastal 
areas. 
In order to get permission for mooring at the Chinese ports, 
the Japanese fishing vessels ordinarily had to file an application 
in advance and they were allowed to cast anchor only after 
approval. But fishing vessels of either party were permitted to 
enter directly the nearest port of the other party without prior 
applications, in the following three emergencies: serious damage 
to a vessel; a complete loss of engine power; and no other vessels 
to tow her to a designated port. 93 Thus a fishing vessel which was 
in immediate and imminent danger of marine disaster but had not 
yet sustained any physical damage could not escape the 
immediate calamity by entering directly the nearest port. 
In most marine disasters requiring emergency shelters, it 
would be extremely difficult to draw a line between the four 
circumstances,94 allowing emergency moorings at the designated 
tleas," 28 _Bull. U.S. Bureau of Fisheries 116, 118 (1908), cited in J. Tomasevich, 
International Agreements on Conservation of Marine Resources 269 (1943). 
92. See infra, text accompanying notes 120-21. 
93. See Clause III of the appendix 4 of the third arrangement. 
94. The four emergencies are as follows: 
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ports only and the three situations allowing direct entry into any 
nearest port. If the "direct entry" provision (clause III) were 
narrowly interpreted so as to cover only the three categories, thus 
excluding such situations as necessary for any precautionary 
protective measures, it would be in conflict with the purpose of 
Article 5 (1) of the same arrangement which requires the Fisheries 
Associations to provide to fishing vessels in distress every 
assistance necessary for rescue and emergency mooring prior to 
suffering physical damage. Clause IX of the same appendix 
required vessels to observe strictly different rules with respect to 
direct entry and the other types of entry. The vessels which 
entered any port not in conformity with the rules were to be tried 
by the local laws of the coastal state and such vessels had to bear 
all the consequences arising therefrom. To the same extent, 
therefore, clause IX would be inconsistent with the spirit of Art. 5 
(1), if clause IX were restrictively applied to each case. 
The mooring time was limited to the duration of typhoon or 
the duration of repairs. In the event the local repair facilities were 
not satisfactory, the vessels under repair should be towed to their 
own country with the help of their own Fisheries Association 
within 10 days under the first arrangement. The third arrange-
ment, however, removed the 10-day-limit provision.95 When a 
fishing vessel entered or left the designated mooring port and 
during the mooring period, it had to observe certain rules 
stipulated by the local laws and this arrangement. Fishing vessels 
rescued had to pay the telegraphic charges and other expenses in 
accordance with the relevant provisions of this arrangement. 
IV. COMPARISON OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ARRANGEMENTS 
WITH THE GOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT 
The governmental agreement is similar to the non-
govemm.ental arrangement, but its contents are simpler. It 
(1) When the safety of the vessel is obviously in danger because its hull is 
seriously damaged or its engine is in serious trouble; 
(2) When a typhoon or inclement weather is encountered, and there is really 
no other way to ward off danger except by emergency mooring; 
(3) When a crew member is seriously wounded or critically ill (not including 
infectious diseases) and urgently needs medical care; 
(4) When it is necessary to escort the rescued crew members or vessels in 
distress to a port of the other side. 
For details, see Clause (1) of appendix 4 of the third arrangement. 
95. Cf. Clause 5 of appendix 3 of the first arrangement and Clause 5 of 
appendix 4 of the third arrangement. 
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consists of a main text (consisting of eight articles), two 
appendices, three exchanges of notes, an agreed minute, and two 
exchanges of letters. Significantly, the governmental agreement 
voices a more conspicuous concern about conservation than does 
the non-governmental agreement. The accord lays down stricter 
rules for ensuring preservation and effective utilization of 
fisheries resources. Interestingly enough, the safety regulation of 
fishing operations, which was one of the main characteristics of 
the non-governmental arrangements, is not stipulated in the 
present agreement. It is to be made non-governmentally by the 
civilian fishing circles of the two parties. Enforcement measures 
are based on a typical national jurisdiction of flag state. Since 
states have become enforcing agencies, such an inefficiency as 
may arise from national jurisdiction might be partially supple-
mented. The government accord provides for emergency rescue 
and shelter, and a joint fisheries commission is newly established. 
The functions and obligations of this commission are discussed in 
the following section, where they are compared with those 
contained in the agreements in the North Pacific Ocean. 
The comparison between the non-governmental and govern-
mental agreements will largely deal with four fields: (1) fishing 
zones, (2) enforcement measures, (3) the fisheries commission and 
(4) miscellaneous problems. The 1965 non-governmental arrange-
ment, which was the latest one, will serve as a basis for the 
following comparison with the governmental agreement. 
A. Fishing Zones 
As was the case in the non-governmental arrangements, the 
present agreement is applicable only to the agreed fishing zones 
in the Yellow and East China Seas; its applicability is also 
excluded from the territorial waters and coastal fisheries of each 
Contracting State. The basic fishing line delimiting the agreed 
fishing zones and the coastal fisheries areas has not been 
changed. However, the agreed fishing zones, to which a GOO-
horsepower limit is to be applied, have been substantially 
expanded up to 100 to 150 miles east of the Chinese mainland 
("horsepower regulation zone"). As a result, the most controversial 
issue during the negotiation of the non-governmental arrange-
ments, i.e., the allocation of fishing zones, is solved in the present 
agreement in favor of the Chinese original intent not only from 
the geographic point of view but also from the point of view of the 
fishing regulation. 
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In the horsepower regulation zone, trawlers with engine 
capacities of 600 horsepower or more and seiners with 660 
horsepower or more are respectively prohibited to operate 
throughout the year (map 5). It may be noted that the horsepower 
regulation zones are agreed-upon areas in line with the eventual 
advent of a 200-mile economic zone, even though the distance is 
shorter than 200 miles and the degree of exclusivity of coastal 
jurisdiction in the zones is less rigid than that of the economic 
zone concept under discussion at the current sessions of the Law 
of the Sea Conference.96 
Some sections of the horsepower regulation zone are desig-
nated by various names for specific fishing regulations. 97 In 
relation to trawling operations, the agreement designates areas 
closed for certain periods to fishing (two "fishery fallow zones")98 
as well as three fishery protection zones in which restrictions are 
placed on both the number of vessels and the fishing period.99 The 
total size of the areas covered by the two fishery fallow zones and 
the three fishery protection zones is approximately the same as 
that of the main six fishing zones under the non-governmental 
arrangement.100 In relation to seining operations, the horsepower 
regulation zone is divided by the line of the 32nd degree northern 
latitude into two seine fishery protection zones (map 5).101 
96. Cf. Art. 45(1) and (2) and Art. 50(2) and (3), particularly (4) of Part II of the 
Informal Single Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8 (1975). 
97. Exceptionally, some parts of the first fishery fallow zone and the first 
protection zone spread over beyond the limit of the horsepower regulation zone. 
98. The fishery fallow zones are regulated both in terms of the fishing period 
and the kind of fishing operation. For details, see Clause 1(2)(i)-(ii) of appendix 1 
of the governmental agreement. 
99. See Clause 1(3)(i)-(iii) of appendix 1 of Clause 1(1) of the agreed minute of 
the governmental agreement. 
100. The first fishery fallow zone is approximately half the total of the first and 
second zones under the non-governmental arrangement. The zone spreads over an 
area roughly three-fourths the total area of the non-governmental third and fourth 
fishing zones. The first fishery protection zone is a new area the most part of 
which thus does not overlap with any agreed fishing areas under either the non-
governmental or governmental agreement. The second fishery protection zone is 
approximately half the area of combined fifth and sixth fishing zones under the 
non-governmental arrangement. The third fishery protection zone is located in the 
southern-most area. 
101. In the first protection zone, all Japanese seiners are to abstain from 
fishing throughout the year. In the second zone, during August through December, 
the maximum number of seiners may not exceed 25 teams for the Japanese and 70 
teams for the Chinese. For the first zone, see Clause 2(2) of appendix 1 of the 
governmental agreement and the Japanese note regarding Clause 2(2) of the 
appendix 1; for the second zone, see Clause 2(3) of the appendix 1 and Clause 1(2) 
of the agreed minute, id. 
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The Sino-Japanese Governmental Fisheries Agreement of 1975 
(Map 5) 
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The trawl fishing prohibited zone as well as the military zones 
are still recognized by the present agreement. These two special 
zones were established in conformity with Chinese domestic laws. 
The military zones will be explained later. The present trawl 
fishing prohibited zone is the same area as the previous one under 
the non-governmental arrangement. 102 The dispute over the 
legality of the zone has not, in legal sense, been resolved, as was 
the case under the non-governmental arrangement. Here again; 
Japan was not strong enough to reject the Chinese unilateral 
claim. The controversy ended as a result of Japan's promising to 
impose self-restraints on her fishermen. Thus, Chinese as well as 
Japanese fishermen were banned from fishing in the zone. 
Furthermore, trawlers have to observe other conservation 
measures in terms of restrictions on the sizes of fish and mesh of 
net, and on the amount of young fish. Seiners also must observe 
the other conservation measures in terms of restrictions on the 
numbers of lighting and netting ships 103 and on the luminicity of 
light, in addition to the same restrictions on trawlers. 
In short, the governmental conservation measures in regard 
to trawlers are exactly the same as the non-governmental ones. 
Likewise, the present conservation measures concerning seiners 
are not much changed. The only changes are a new restriction on 
the number of netting ships and more restrictions on the sizes of 
fish and net. As regard the size of fishing zones, the seining zones 
in fact are not much changed since the present 660 horsepower 
limit is the same as the previous limit and the size of areas is 
almost identical in both the governmental and non-governmental 
agreements, except for a slight variation of marginal line of the 
horsepower regulation zones toward the northeast. However, the 
horsepower regulation zones relating to trawlers are largely 
different in the governmental and non-governmental agreements 
since the 600 horsepower limit and the zones connected with it are 
newly established for the purpose of trawl fishing regulations. 
102. This zone is east of the basic fishing line drawn from the northern-most 
point at 37 degrees 3 minutes down to the southern-most point at 27 degrees and 
121 degrees 10 minutes east longitude. 
103. The provision about the netting ship is new. The non-governmental 
arrangement did not limit the number of netting ships. Thus, more young fish will 
be protected as much as such restrictions are increased. Cf. Clause 2(5) of appendix 
1 of the governmental agreement and Clause 2 and 3 of the non-governmental 
seine arrangement. 
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B. Enforcement M:essures 
By enforcement is meant the procedure through which the 
obedience of fishing vessels to the governmental and non-
governmental agreements is to be secured. The present enforce-
ment of both trawling and seining operations is considered in one 
provision (Art. 3). The assessment of the present enforcement 
measures is largely based on the regulations applicable to fishing 
zones, 104 and relates to the following issues: (1) conservation 
methods (2) safety of fishing operations (3) methods of inspection 
and (4) sanctions. The first two are concerned with the scope of 
enforcement measures and in consequence they set the criteria for 
determining violations, and the latter two are related to the legal 
form and effect of the present enforcement measures. 
1. Scope of Enforcement 
As has already been shown, the conservation measures 
accepted by the present agreement have not changed from those 
contained in the non-governmental arrangements. Thus, in the 
event of violation of the number of vessels in the agreed fishing 
zones or of the limit of the fishing zones, each Contracting State 
as an enforcing agency is now obliged to find such violation and 
to report to the other State. But in regard to infringement of 
restriction on the amount of young fish caught, the "quasi-port 
jurisdiction" contained in the non-governmental arrangement is 
not provided in the governmental agreement. The safety regula-
tions, navigational rules and the regulation concerning the 
settlement of marine incidents are to be agreed on a non-
governmental basis in the future. 105 At this point, therefore, the 
non-governmental enforcement measures for collision or damage 
disputes can not be comparatively discussed. 
The scope of the governmental measures has become more 
restrictive than that of the non-governmental ones, in view of the 
104. Art. 1 and Clause 3 of the agreed minute of the governmental agreement. 
These provision raise a question how violations of fishing vessels in the coastal 
fishing zone will be controlled. For example, as to "hot pursuit" see infra note 143. 
105. See Art. 4 of the main text and Clause of the agreed minute of the 
governmental agreement. The matters are now left to the civilian fishing 
industries of the two states for further negotiations. The subjects to be agreed are 
as follows: (1) marks and signals; (2) rules to be observed in operation; (3) 
provisions for making way for each other; (4) provisions for mooring; (5) customary 
rules for safe fishing operations; and (6) provisions dealing with marine incidents. 
Also, compare with the relevant provisions of the Korea·Japan Fisheries 
Convention at supra note 1. 
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increase in the size of the regulated fishing zones and of the 
decrease in the amount of catchable young fish. Also, the subject 
of enforcement has shifted from the Fisheries Associations under 
the non-governmental arrangements to the States under the 
present agreement. Thus the responsibilities for the enforcement 
of such conservation methods are entrusted primarily to each 
Contracting State. This shift of the power of enforcement from one 
body to another seems to increase the function of enforcement 
since means and powers exercised by a State are generally 
regarded more inclusive and broader than those exercised by a 
civilian fishing association.106 But the effectiveness of the present 
methods of conservation remains to be compared with other types 
of conservation measures such as quotas, gear restrictions, entry 
limit, etc.10 7 
2. Legal Form and Effect of Enforcement 
The effectiveness of conservation measures is closely related 
to the mutual cooperation of fishermen and the legal system of 
enforcement. The present agreement does not provide any details 
concerning the duties of enforcements, but lays down in general 
terms that each state is obliged in the first place to supervise and 
instruct all fishing vessels under its own jurisidction in order to 
ensure the implementation of the agreement and to avoid any 
violations of the agreement. In addition, each state is obliged to 
take action against any violations by its own fishing vessels.1°8 
Moreover, all fishing vessels, both trawlers and seiners, operating 
in the agreed fishing zones have to cooperate with each other in 
order that they may secure the enforcing of this agreement. 109 In 
this regard, it seems appropriate to assume that such an 
obligation of vessels to cooperate would be limited to that of 
notification of violations by foreign vessels through the channel 
of their own government to the other state to which violating 
vessels belong, since the notification obligation is to be dealt with 
on the governmental level under the present agreement. As a 
result, the current notification obligation of trawlers is identical to 
that under the non-governmental arrangement. On the other 
106. Cf. Art. 3(1), id. with Art. 9 of the third non-governmental arrangement 
and Clause 6(1) of the non-governmental seine arrangement. 
107. See D. Johnston, The International Law of Fisheries 59-68 (1965). And 
compare with the conservation measures under the Northwest Pacific Fisheries 
Convention, infra at 64-72. • 
108. Art. 3(1) of the governmental agreement. 
109. Art. 3(3) of the governmental agreement. 
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hand, seiners under the present accord have a mere notification 
obligation but seiners under the non-governmental arrangement 
had not only notifying but also supervising obligations in 1 he 
course of their operations. 
In regard to the definition of enforcement agency, most other 
fisheries conventions ordinarily provide that certain types of 
vessels or certain kinds of authorized officers have to be 
designated in order to find infringements.110 Since the present 
agreement is silent on the question, 111 the two contracting parties 
are given some discretion in interpreting the term "state" as an 
agency for finding or determining violations. In modern treaty 
practice, the enforcement function does not necessarily belong to 
the navy of the state.112 However, if Japan or China is somewhat 
overenthusiastic in exercising enforcement, the possibility has not 
been ruled out that the present agreement may include, as an 
inspection agency, naval vessels, in addition to the state-run 
vessels commanded by a specially appointed officer, aircraft and 
civilian ships. 
110. See Art. Il(l) of the Convention of the Preservation of the Halibut Fishery 
of the North Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea, March 2, 1953, 222 U.N.T.S. 77 (1955), 
to which the parties are Canada and the United States; Art. Vl(1) of the Interim 
Convention on Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals, February 9, 1957, 314 
U.N.T.S. 105 (1958). The parties are Canada, Japan, U.S.S.R. and the United 
States; Art. IX of the Convention for the Protection, Preservation and Extension of 
the Sockeye Salmon Fishery of the Fraser River System, May 26, 1930, 1 U.N. 
Legislative Series, Laws and Regulations on the Regime of the High Seas 195-98 
(1951). The parties are Canada and the United States; Art. X of the International 
Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean, May 9, 1952, 
205 U.N.T.S. 65 (1955). The parties are Canada, Japan and the United States; Art. 
VII (1) of the Treaty Concerning Fisheries on the High Seas in the Northwest 
Pacific Ocean, May 14, 1956, 53 Am. J. Int'l L. 763 (1959). The parties are Japan 
and U.S.S.R. Even the United States seems to have trouble in policing effectively 
its 12-mile fisheries zones. For details on it and other policing problems, see 
Commission of Marine Science, Engineering, and Resources, Panel Report, Marine 
Resources and Legal-Political Arrangements for their Development, H.R. Doc. N. 
91-2, part 3, 9Ist Cong., 1st Sess. at VIII 55 (1969); Carroz and Roche "The 
International Policing of High Seas Fisheries," [1968] Can. Y.B. Int'l L. 62 (1968). 
111. As far as trawl fishing is concerned, compared with the non-governmental 
arrangement, the present agreement has developed a step forward since it provides 
at least some procedures for finding any violations of regulations. Under the non-
governmental trawl fishing arrangement, there were neither supervising authori-
ties nor any other enforcement agencies. For further discussion, see supra, text 
accompanying note 81. 
112. See Koers, "The Enforcement of International Fisheries Agreements," 1 
Neth. Y.B. Int'l L. 8 (1970); A. Koers, International Regulation of Marine Fisheries: 
A Study of Regional Fisheries Organizations (1973). 
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With respect to the powers of the enforcement agency, a 
general requirement is that authorized officers must carry 
documents of identity and that their vessels must show a special 
flag or pennant. Under the present agreement, however, it is not 
clear whether each contracting state as an inspection agency 
should be obliged to observe such limitations. The previous non-
governmental seine fishing arrangement had a provision requir-
ing inspection ships and inspectors to comply with the above 
conditions. As far as seining operations are concerned, therefore, 
it seems that the present provision in regard to the powers of the 
inspection agency is a backward step compared with the previous 
one. A critical question with respect to the authority of the 
inspectors is whether inspectors under the present agreement 
have power to visit and search any ship suspected of violations 
before they are established as infractions. In this connection, it is 
not easy to answer whether a "reasonable cause" would be 
sufficient for the inspectors under the present agreement to act on 
suspected infringements. Even after an infraction is established, 
it is still problematic to decide how far the enforcement agency 
under the present agreement can exercise its authority in order to 
obtain evidence and to deter further infractions on the spot. In 
other words, the question in these circumstances is whether the 
inspectors have authority to arrest or seize such persons or 
vessels. It is also imaginable that a state may often encounter 
some dissatisfaction in relation to the punitive measures taken by 
the othei atate if the latter, while exercising the jurisdiction of the 
flag state over its own vessels, acts on prosecution and punish-
ment in an arbitrary fashion. 
With respect to all of those questions, the pertinent paragraph 
2 of Article 3 of the agreement simply stipulates as follows: 
Either of the contracting states is entitled to notify the other 
contracting state of the facts and circumstances of the 
violations by foreign fishing vessels of the provisions of 
appendix I of this agreement. The contracting state thus 
notified shall promptly inform the other aggrieved state of 
the results of the action it has taken. 113 
From this paragraph, some implications may be drawn to 
give at least some general answers to the above questions. First, 
the agreement stresses the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state 
with respect to prosecution and punishment of infractions. If 
113. Art. 3(2) of the governmental agreement. 
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inspection agencies such as naval vessels or government-owned 
vessels have a reasonable cause to believe that fishing vessels of 
the other state have violated a provision of the agreement, they 
might exercise their enforcement authority to the extent allegedly 
"necessary or appropriate" for obtaining evidence or witnesses. In 
this connection, if there is a dispute between the two parties about 
the proper exercise of enforcement authority, the agreement does 
not provide for guidelines for the solution. Instead, the agreement, 
in a considerable measure, indicates that the state as an 
inspection agency may have discretion in choosing and exercising 
the instruments of inspection, since the inspection power is 
conferred on the state without specifying the scope of the 
discretion. And in the special circumstances where the two 
contracting states want to exercise concurrently the enforcement 
authority relating to finding infractions, the agreement indicates 
the primacy of the flag state jurisdiction; the latter would prevail 
over in light of the responsibility of the flag state for supervising 
and instructing its vessels in order to have them observe 
regulations. 114 
Even though flag state jurisdiction is established with respect 
to prosecution and punishment, the agreement is still silent on the 
sanctions against any infractions. The non-governmental arran-
gements provided at least for three different sanctions, i.e., 
warning, punishment (in case of trawlers) and warning, fine, or 
disqualification (in case of seiners), depending on the merits of 
each case. In view of primary responsibility of each contracting 
state for exercising surveillance over its own fishermen, a 
question is raised as to whether sanctions should be imposed on 
fishermen or state if a state fails to implement such an obligation. 
The present agreement does not establish a legal channel for 
settling disputes arising from enforcement measures. The previous 
arrangement provided at least negotiations as a final method of 
dispute settlement, but the governmental agreement does not 
mention any method at all. Therefore, the current method of 
dispute settlement is exclusively in the hands of the contracting 
flag state as it was in the previous arrangement. 
The agreed fishing zones under the present agreement are 
larger than those under the non-governmental arrangements. If 
the methods of enforcements are restrictively defined so as to 
comprise only a certain kind of inspection vessels or a certain 
kind of inspectors holding certain commissions, the policing of the 
114. Id., Art. 1. 
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presently enlarged fishing zones is likely to be much less effective 
in proportion to the increased fishing areas and the restricted 
methods of enforcement. Under the present agreement, however, 
China may exercise an unrestricted discretional power in selecting 
and exhausting its available instruments and means for an 
inspection purpose. This is one of the ambiguous provisions that 
China might utilize for its expedience. On the other hand, the 
methods of enforcement, without naming the kinds of punish-
ments, may enable Japan, while exercising the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the flag state over its vessels, to exercise a discretionary 
power in assessing or imposing the penalties for the infringe-
ments by its own vessels. 
Insofar as state power tends to be abused, the success of the 
present enforcement system depends largely on the political 
relations between the two states, since on the one hand, the 
authority of determining of any infringements is entrusted to the 
policing state and, on the other, the authority for imposing any 
penalties for violations is given to the flag state, without any 
limitations on such authority. If diplomatic relations between the 
states should deteriorate for whatever reasons, then the enforcing 
power of the state in accordance with the present agreement could 
be enlarged without being checked by means of treaty provisions; 
on the other hand, a certain degree of checking power is exerted 
by the binding authority of the treaty provisions under normal 
treaty relations. 
C. Fisheries Commission 
Since the fisheries agreement has been transformed from a 
non-governmental to a governmental accord, in theory all the 
problems derived from the governmental agreement should be 
dealt with by the government. The establishment of a fisheries 
commission, however, provides an intermediate instrument for 
resolving fishery problems. A comparison of the non-
governmental and governmental agreements about the problems 
of the fisheries commissions cannot be made at this stage since 
the non-governmental arrangements had no fisheries commission. 
In this section, only the most important functions of the 
Commission are introduced. 
First, the Commission is to review the implementation of the 
agreement and, if necessary, to recommend to both contracting 
states the revision of the appendices of the agreement. The legal 
capacities of the Commission are to be limited to the recommenda-
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tions for the revision of the conservation measures since the 
appendices deal only with matters relating to conservation 
measures. All the resolutions, recommendations and other 
decisions of the Commission are to be made only by the mutual 
agreement of the commissioners attending the meeting. The 
requirement for "mutual agreement or concurrence" for those 
purposes is commonly provided in most of the fisheries conven-
tions.115 The Commission is not vested with an extensive power to 
enter into agreement as an independent entity, which often may 
be seen in other international fisheries conventions.116 The 
recommendations are to be binding on member states if they are 
accepted by the contracting states through an exchange of 
notes.117 In short, the Commission has no decision-making 
function. 
Another function of the Commission is to exchange data 
concerning fisheries and to review the conditions of fishery 
resources in the agreed fishing zones.U8 The Fisheries Associa-
tions of both parties under the non-governmental arrangements 
were not obliged but willing to exchange data concerning fishery 
investigations and research, etc. When it is deemed necessary, the 
Commission is to review the conservation measures with respect 
to fishery resources and any problems related to conservation. 
Similarly, the Fisheries Associations under the non-governmental 
arrangements were to enforce the conservation measures. In this 
regard, the previous Fisheries Associations appeared more like an 
enforcing agency, while the present Commission appears to be 
more like a reviewing agency.119 
D. Other Problems 
As shown above, the present agreement does not yet contain 
provisions concerning the regulation of safety operations, and the 
provisions about the marine research data under the non-
governmental arrangements are shortened into a provision 
concerning the functions of the Fisheries Commission. Thus the 
remaining problems of the present agreement which need to be 
compared relate to emergency rescue and mooring. 
115. Id., Art. 6(3). 
116. See, for example, the International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic 
Fisheries (1950); the Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission (1963). 
117. Art. 7(2) of the governmental agreement. 
118. Id., Art. 6(4)(iii). 
119. For further discussions on the Commission, see infra, text accompanying 
notes 176-86. 
1916 SINO-JAPANESE FISHERIES AGREEMENT 45 
The present agreement lays down two situations in which 
each state ought to provide assistance and protection to fishing 
vessels in distress: marine disaster and irresistible calamities.120 
The previous non-governmental arrangement stipulated four 
specific marine emergencies. In the case of emergency, the present 
agreement further obliges each coastal state to inform authorities 
of the accident. The agreement does not, however, specify what 
kinds of marine disasters ought to be considered as justifying an 
emergency shelter. Instead it explicitly mentions only bad 
weather and irresistible calamities as situations where sheltering 
is required. 121 
In circumstances where it would be impossible for a fishing 
vessel in distress to reach its designated port, the present 
agreement does not state what kind of emergencies would justify a 
direct entry into the nearest port of the coastal state. Rather, it 
defmes the situation as an event in which the vessels in distress 
"cannot enter any designated ports." The non-governmental 
arrangement enumerated in a restrictive manner three situations 
for direct entries.12z 
In any emergency, the only requirement under the present 
agreement for entering the designated ports is the notification of 
such an emergency situation.123 Vessels are, of course, required to 
act in good faith in making such reports. But in more serious 
circumstances, where the fishing vessels cannot enter the 
designated ports, they have to explain the reasons by means of 
notice to the authorities concerned prior to making direct entry 
into any nearest port. Thus, under the present agreement, a 
situation meeting the characteristics of marine disaster or 
irresistible calamities would allow entry into designated port with 
requirement of notification, while a situation in which a vessel in 
distress "cannot enter any designated ports" would allow direct 
entry into any nearest port with requirement of explaining the 
reasons. Once fishing vessels have entered the ports of the coastal 
120. Art. 5(1) of the governmental agreement. 
121. Id., Art. 5(2). It is not explicit as to what are bad weather and irresistible 
calamities. 
122. Id., Clause 1(3) of the appendix II, and see supra, text accompanying note 
94. 
123. The contents of a notice must include the following: the name of vessel, a 
call sign, present location, a port registration, a net tonnage, name of captain, 
number of crew, destination of sheltering port, the expected time of arrival, and the 
reasons for shelter. See Clause 3 of the appendix II of the governmental agreement. 
For the other methods of contacting the harbor authorities, see id., Clause 2 and 4 
of the appendix II; and for the designated ports, see id., Clause 1. 
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states, they must abide by the pertinent provisions of the 
agreement, the local regulations and instructions. In this 
connection, two hypothetical questions arise. First, for example, in 
the event of a serious injury to, or critical illness of, the crew, it is 
uncertain whether the authorities of the coastal state could refuse 
request for entry into designated port on the ground that the 
situation does not fall under the two categories such as marine 
disaster or irresistible calamities. Second, it is also uncertain 
whether the local judicial authority could punish any vessels of 
the other party which had directly entered the nearest ports 
complying with the requirement for explaining the reasons for 
allegedly more serious circumstances where the vessels cannot 
enter the designated ports. In regard to the latter question, the 
provisions of the non-governmental and governmental agree-
ments may be compared. The three categorical emergencies 
provided in the non-governmental arrangement might set the 
criteria for assessing the severity of emergencies and for 
sanctioning any violations thereof. 124 On the other hand, they 
might cause some inflexibility in interpreting the spirit of the 
emergency rescue provisions since they required the existence of a 
certain damage or damages prior to making any direct entry into 
the nearest port. 
The present agreement, without naming categorical emergen-
cies, seems more flexible in allowing direct entry since the 
situation where vessels cannot enter designated ports may be 
interpreted more flexibly than the enumerated situation. From 
that point of view, the provisions of the present agreement seem to 
serve better the purport of rescuing and protecting human lives 
and properties from the marine disaster than those of the previous 
arrangement, as far as direct entry is concerned. 
V. COMPARISON OF GOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT WITH OTHER 
NORTH PACIFIC FISHERIES CONVENTIONS 
The North Pacific fisheries conventions chosen to be com-
pared with the governmental agreement are the 1965 Korea-Japan 
Fisheries Convention, the Soviet-Japanese Northwest Pacific 
Fisheries Convention, and the International Fisheries Convention 
on the North Pacific Ocean. The comparison focuses on the main 
124. Under the non-governmental arrangement, some sanctional measures 
might be imposed on fishing vessels, if the vessels entered designated or non-
designated ports not in conformity with the each allowable emergency. For details, 
see supra, text accompanying notes 92-94. 
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legal issues contained in each convention, namely, (1) fishing 
zones, (2) enforcement measures and (3) fisheries commissions. 
The Korea-Japan Fisheries Convention125 (the Korea-
Japan Convention). This convention is the result of 14 years of 
hard negotiations between the two states since the Korean 
Proclamation of Peace (Rhee) Line in 1952 until the conclusion of 
the Convention in 1965.126 The mandatory life of the Agreement 
was 5 years, which elapsed in December, 1970; and it is now 
terminable one year after the date of giving notice. 
The remarkable features of the Convention are, among others, 
that: a most stanch supporter of the three-mile limit virtually for 
all purposes, Japan recognized for the first time an exclusive 12-
mile fisheries zone off the coast of a foreign country (Korea};127 
both parties agreed to the establishment of a third party 
arbitration for the settlement of disputes;128 and they set up the 
joint fishery resources survey zone without deciding upon the 
subjects and contents of the survey (map 6). 
The Soviet-Japanese Northwest Pacific Fisheries 
Convention (the Soviet-Japanese Convention).l29 Since World 
War II, the Soviet Union and Japan have not been able to agree 
on a peace treaty;130 thus, in legal sense, a state of war had existed 
125. For the text, see 4 Int'l Legal Mats 1128 (1965). 
126. For discussions of the Japan·Korea Fishery Agreement, see Takabayashi, 
"Normalization of Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea: Agreement 
on Fisheries," 10 Jap. Ann. Int'l L. 16-22 (1966); G. Weissberg, supra note 22; Oda, 
"Japan and International Conventions Relating to North Pacific Fisheries," 43 
Wash. L. Rev. 63, 70-73 (1967); Park, supra note 13 at 102-110. 
127. Prior to this convention, Japan accepted the prohibition of drift net fishing 
operations within 40 miles off the coasts of either party, in accordance with the 
Japan-U.S.S.R. Fishery Convention of 1956. This, therefore, should be noted as a 
precedent for the extension of coastal jurisdiction accepted by Japan. For details, 
see infra, text accompanying note 152-53. And for another type of fishery zones 
recognized by a multinational fisheries convention, see Arts. 2 and 3 of the 
European Convention on Fisheries, of 1964. For its text, see supra note 87. 
128. This arbitration clause may be regarded as unique except for a similar 
provision of the European Convention on Fisheries of 1964 (Arts. 13 and Annex II 
1-15). The article of the Korea-Japan Convention seems to indicate that both 
states had met earlier some complicated and hard fishery problems; and that they 
intend to solve such problems in an agreed legal framework. Such a legalistic 
method for the settlement of disputes seems significant at least to the East Asian 
peoples who have traditionally preferred the diplomatic channel for solution of 
conflicting interests. In this connexion, compare the provisions of the Japanese-
Chinese non-governmental arrangement at supra, text accompanying note 81. 
129. For the text, see supra note 110. 
130. See The New York Times, at 1 and 2, col. 3 (Jan. 14, 1976). 
48 CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES 
Korea-Japan Fisheries Convention (Map 6) 
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1975 SINO-JAPANESE FISHERIES AGREEMENT 49 
until October 1956 when the two states signed a Joint Declaration 
terminating the state of war. 131 Particularly in the early 1950's, 
the safety of the Japanese fishing activities in the Northwest 
Pacific Ocean was not guaranteed because of the state of war. For 
protection of the Japanese fishing industry in that region, as an 
initiative of Japan, the fishery negotiations between the two 
states started in 1955 at London, and finally the agreement was 
reached on March 14, 1956.132 The mandatory life of this 
Convention was 10 years, which expired in March 1966; it is now 
terminable through a one-year termination notice. 
The International Fisheries Convention on the North 
Pacific Ocean (the Tripartite convention between Canada, 
Japan, and the United States).l33 This convention was the first 
fruit of the 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty imposing on Japan 
an obligation to negotiate with the Allied Powers about the 
fisheries problems.134 Since the convention was signed prior to the 
signing of the Peace Treaty, there have been some arguments 
about the sovereign equality of Japan in the process of concluding 
it. 135 The treaty had a mandatory life of 10 years, which elapsed in 
June 19n8; it is now terminable on one year written notice. 136 
l:H. For the text, see 263 U.N. T.S. 112 (1957). 
132. For the historical development and legal analysis of the Agreement, see 
Ohira, supra note 69, at 1-18, Kawakami, "Outline of the Japanese-Soviet Fishery 
Talks (1962)," 7 Jap. Ann. Int'l L. 24-29 (1963); S. Oda, International Control of 
Sea Resources 28-31, 72-76 (1963); Oda, supra note 126, at 67-70; for a policy 
consideration in relation to Canada and the United States, see Ginsburgs and 
Shrewsbury, "The Soviet-Japanese Fisheries Problem in the North-West Pacific, 
1945-56," 1 Int'l Studies 259, 271-72 (1964). 
133. For the text, supra note 125. 
134. See supra, text accompanying notes 32-34. 
135. Although the Allied Commander issued a memorandum to the Japanese 
government for the purposes of negotiating, signing and ratifying the Convention, 
the Japanese delegation was given the status of a sovereign delegation. For the 
,Japanese arguments, see Oda, supra note 126, at 64; and for the excellent 
discussion of the positions of Canada and the United States, see Johnson, "The 
Japan-United States Salmon Conflict," 43 Wash. L. Rev. 1-43 (1967). 
136. Since the Tripartite convention was made, nine bilateral fisheries·related 
agreements have been made between Japan and the United States. Most of them 
have directly or indirectly modified the Tripartite convention in relation to Japan 
and the United States. Two of them directly related to this convention are: An 
Exchange of Notes May 9, 1967 whereby Japan agreed to curtail certain fisheries 
within the 12-mile U.S. fisheries zones, and to limit some fisheries altogether, 6 
Int'l Legal Mats 745 (1967); Agreement between the United States and Japan 
Concerning Salmon Fishing, Dec. 24, 1974, U.S.L.C. Congressional Research 
Service, Treaties and Other International Agreements on Fisheries 795 (1974). For 
further information, see Windley, "International Practice Regarding Traditional 
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The convention has two distinctive features: (1) the initiation 
of the "abstention principle," whereby Japan, and to a lesser 
extent Canada, agreed to abstain from fishing stocks of certain 
speCies of salmon in certain areas;137 and (2) the arbitration clause 
providing for a "special committee" consisting of scientists from 
neutral countries. 13B 
A. Fishing Zones 
A common feature of the Sino-Japanese governmental 
agreement and all the other fisheries conventions mentioned, is 
that they do not apply to the territorial waters of the contracting 
states.139 Another common distinction among them, except for the 
Soviet-Japanese Convention, is that they do not apply to the 
coastal fisheries.140 A third distinction is that while the fishing 
Fishing Privileges of Foreign Fishermen 'in Zones of Extended Maritime 
Jurisdiction," 63 Am. J. lnt'l L. 490, 493-4 (1969); W. Parker, Alaska and the Law 
of the Sea: International Fisheries Regimes of the Northpacific 28-46 (1974). 
137. For comments on international fisheries problems in the North Pacific 
Ocean, see K. Barnes, North Pacific Fisheries with Special Reference to Alaska 
Salmon 286-302 (1939); J. Tomasevich, supra note 91, at 29-36; Kuhn, "The 
Proposed International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North 
Pacific Ocean," 46 Am. J. lnt'l L. 323-30 (1952); Note, "A Map Analysis of Japan's 
Fishery Problems," 3 Jap. Ann. Int'l L. 103, 105-6 (1959); Comment, "North Pacific 
Fisheries Treaties and International Law of the Seas," 38 Wash L. Rev. 223-48 
(1963); Nakamura, "The Japan-United States Negotiations concerning King Crab 
Fishery in the Eastern Bering Sea," 9 Jap. Ann. Int'l L. 36-45 (1965); particularly 
for the Japanese practice in international law on the principle of abstention, see id. 
at 121-6; Herrington, "International Issues of Pacific Fisheries," 55 Dep't of State 
Bull. No. 1420, 500-4 (1966); Johnson supra note 135, at 1-43; Oda, supra note 126 
at 63-75; Johnston, "New Uses of International Law in the North Pacific," 43 
Wash. L. Rev. 77-113 (1967); Nagasaki, "Some Japanese Far-Sea Fisheries," 43 
Wash. L. Rev. 199-229 (1967); Swygard, "Politics of the North Pacific Fisheries 
with Special Reference to the Twelve-Mile Bill," 43 Wash. L. Rev. 269-82 (1967); 
Crutchfield, "Management of the North Pacific Fisheries," id. at 283-307; Jacobs, 
"United States Participation in International Fisheries Agreements," 6 J. Mar. L. 
Comm. 4 71-529 (1975). 
138. The idea of establishing an arbitration by specialists on the particular 
subject matters seems to be well reflected in the current Conference on the Law of 
the Sea. See Special Procedures on the settlement of fishery disputes, Annes IIA of 
Pt. IV of the Informal Single Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.9 
(1975). 
139. Art. 1(1) and Clause 3 of the agreed minute, the governmental agreement; 
Art. 1(1), Korea-Japan Convention; Art. 1(1), Soviet-Japanese Convention; and Art. 
1(1) and (2), the Tripartite Convention. 
140. Id. The Soviet-Japanese Convention prohibits fishing operations by drift 
net in the waters within 40 miles off the coasts of the territories of either party. It 
may thus be said that the Convention also does not apply to coastal fisheries in 
narrow sense. 
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zones under both the Sino-Japanese and the Korea-Japan 
conventions are defined in detail in terms of longitude and 
latitude, those under the Sovient-.Japanese and Tripartite conven-
tions are designated by several lines and the names of the areas. 
1. Korea-Japan Convention 
The Korea-Japan Convention involves more legal issues with 
respect to defining the fishing zones than the Sino-Japanese 
agreement and the other conventions. Since the Convention 
recognizes a 12-mile exclusive fishing zone of either party, one 
area in the Korean Strait overlaps between Tsushima Island 
(Japan) and the southern part of Korea. The longest and shortest 
distances of the Korean Strait between the Japanese Island and 
the Korean coast are 26.2 and 23.2 miles, respectively. The fishing 
zone was divided into two parts by compromise, and thus the 
method of delimiting the zone deviates from the median-line 
principle stipulated by Article 12 of the Geneva Convention on the 
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. With regard to the baseline, 
the Korea-Japan Convention has a peculiar provision stipulating 
that the straight baReline shall be determined through "consulta-
tion" with the other party. The Korean Peninsula is surrounded 
by the sea in the east, south and west. The east coast has no 
indentations or islands which could cause problems in relation to 
drawing straight baselines or closing lines. 141 But the south and 
west coasts have many highly irregular indentations as well as 
over 3,000 islands. The geography itself would justify the drawing 
of reasonable straight baselines. The four straight baselines 
drawn by Korea did not incur any objections from Japan or other 
countries. Thus it does not appear that the southern and western 
coasts of Korea need consultation with the other interested 
countries for the purpose of drawing straight lines in accordance 
with international standards.142 
The Korea-Japan Convention provides for a joint fishery 
regulation zone which excludes in fact the Japanese 3-mile 
territorial sea and the Korean 12-mile exclusive fishery zone. 14 3 
141. Japan did not ohject to the closing lines at the mouths of the two bays 
along the Korean east coast (the Yungil Bay and Ulsan Bay). 
142. Compare with the Chinese straight baseline, at supra text accompanying 
note 41. 
143. The Korean Government has never enunciated the policy on the breadth of 
the territorial watPrs. Customarily, Korea has observed the 3-mile limit. As a 
result, Korea became involved in a question as to whether the right of "hot 
pursuit" could be exercised from the fishery zone. In March, 1966, the Kaiyomaru 
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The joint regulation zone is the main convention area comparable 
to the fishing zones under the Sino-Japanese agreement for the 
purpose of conservation measures. 144 In addition, joint resources 
survey zones were established outside of the joint control zone by 
the 1967 exchange of letters at the recommendation of the Korea-
Japan Joint Fisheries Commission at its first session of 1966. The 
conservation measures in the joint regulation zone are principally 
of a provisional character since they will cease to apply whenever 
the scientific surveys show that the measures do not provide for 
the maximum sustainable productivity of fishery resources. 145 As 
No. 53, a Japanese fishing vessel, was caught by a Korean patrol boat for allegedly 
violating the limit of the 12-mile exclusive fishing zone. Japan argued that "since 
there were no provisions in the Korea-Japan Convention concerning the rights of 
hot pursuit, the question had to be regulated by the rules of general international 
law, and that under international law, it was not recognized that a State can 
exercise the right of hot pursuit starting from the exclusive zone. For a counter 
argument, Korea claimed that "in any case the vessel had been fishing within the 
exclusive fishery zone of Korea established under this convention, and that the 
vessel could be caught in the exercise of the right of hot pursuit by the Korean 
patrol boats." See Japanese practice in international law, 13 Jap. Ann. Int'l L. 83-
84 (1969). With regard to the same issue, on June 17, 1975, a United States District 
Court, in the cases of United States v. Fishing Vessel Taiyo Maru No. 281 and 
United States v. Kawaguchi, held that "nothing in the Convention on the 
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone affirmatively prohibits a coastal state 
from creating a contiguous zone for purposes other than the four enumerated 
ones." The Court pointed out that "nothing in Article 24 of the Convention 
precludes the establishment of such a zone for other purposes, including the 
enforcement of domestic fisheries law." In the case, it is worth noting that Japan 
did not protest with specific reference to hot pursuit originating in the contiguous 
fisheries zone. For details, see U.S. Senate, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess., Hearings before 
the Comm. on Armed Services, Extending Jurisdiction of the U.S. Over Certain 
Ocean Areas 185 (1974); Fidell, "Hot Pursuit From a Fisheries Zone," 70 Am. J. 
Int'l L. 95, 98, 99 (1976). Finally, the idea contained in the Informal Negotiating 
Text of the 1975 Geneva session of the Third Law of the Sea Conference seems to 
indicate the possible future guideline on the problem. Article 97(2) and (4) stipulate 
that the right of hot pursuit shall apply not only to violations of the territorial sea 
and the contiguous zone but also to those of the 200-mile exclusive economic zone 
and continental shelf. See U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP/8/Part II, at 36 (1975). 
144. Korea has been implementing a whaling license system to conserve whales 
in the joint regulation zone and according to the Convention, Korea has been 
maintaining the number of whale licenses as it was on the date of the Convention. 
See M. Savini, Report on International and National Legislation {or the 
Conservation of Marine Mammals: Part 1. International Legislation 57 (Rome, 
1974), FAO, Doc. FIRD/C326 (1974). 
145. The 8th Annual Meeting of the Korea-Japan Joint Fisheries Commission, 
held at Tokyo on July 25 through July 28, 1973, reported that, except for the 
stability of high level of mackerel, the productivities of the following fish: horse 
mackerel, yellow corvenia, hail tail, shrimp and red sea beam, etc., showed gradual 
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has been done in other fishery conventions, the conservation 
measures depend on typical regulations concerning certain types 
of fisheries (the dragnet fishing, seine fishing, and mackerel-
angling fishing), 146 and limiting the gross tonnage (not less than 
60 tons), the number of fishing vessels, the size of mesh and the 
power of the luring lights. In this respect, the Korean-Japanese 
methods of regulation are not much different from the Sino-
Japanese methods. Both conventions are oriented to the power of 
the vessel, i.e., the Korea-Japan convention concerns gross 
tonnage and the Sino-Japanese agreement the horsepower, and 
the other orthodox methods of conservation are identical in each 
agreement. 
The Korea-Japan convention contains a notable provision 
relating to the so-called idea of "equal sharing" of sea resources. 
Each contracting party is equally obliged not to land more than 
150,000 tons of the above-mentioned three kinds of fish altogether 
(map 6).147 In this respect, it is questionable whether Korea, as a 
coastal state, has been denied some sort of special interest 
generally recognized by the international conventional rules and 
practices.148 In normal situations, it is unquestionable that most 
of the fisheries agreements have given weight to the interests of 
coastal states, when they allocate the amount of fish catch, the 
fishing zones or the number of fishing vessels, etc. As earlier 
shown, the Sino-Japanese agreements, all consistently gave a 
favorable consideration to the interests of China.149 
In addition, the Convention has another remarkable provision 
in relation to the estimation of the total annual quota of fish 
catch. For that purpose, each party is obliged to report to the other 
party at least four times every year the amount of fish monthly 
caught in the zone. 150 Furthermore, the convention provides that if 
the total amount of the annual fish catch is likely to exceed 
150,000 tons with allowance of 10% or less, each government has 
to administratively readjust the number of vessels or teams of 
declines. It thus recognized the necessity for further studies and investigations of 
the fisheries for reasonable evaluation as well as the need for specific reviews of 
the rational management of fishery resources. See Korean Association of Fisheries 
Technics, The Fisheries Annual of 1974 (in Korean) 64-65 (1974). 
146. The mackerel is regarded as the most important fish in the joint regulation 
zone. 
147. Clause 2(a) of the Agreed Minute. 
148. See Art. 8(1), of the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living 
Resources of the High Seas. 
149. See supra, text accompanying notes 65-76. 
150. Clause 2(c) of the Agreed Minute. 
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fishing vessels even during the fishing periods in order to keep the 
total annual catch of fish at not more than 165,000 tons. As a 
result, the checking on the proper implementation of the annual 
quotas remains principally under the voluntary control of each 
party. It is thus questionable whether the main theme of the 
convention, viz., the effectiveness of controlling the maximum 
quota of annual fish catches, would be achieved as it was 
originally intended.I5I 
2. The Soviet-Japanese Convention 
The fishing zones are to be designated according to the kinds 
of fish stocks (salmon, king crab and herring), and a certain type 
of fishing zones (prohibited areas) can be amended upon further 
scientific evidence. The annual quota for the salmon catch in the 
regulatory areas is to be determined by the Joint Fisheries 
Commission. The Convention mainly concerns the salmon fishing 
operations and thus sets up in detail the salmon fishing zones. As 
regards the king crab fishing, two prohibited areas are set up but 
there are not yet herring fishing areas. 
Salmon Fishing Zones. These zones cover all the North-
west Pacific Ocean (including the Okhotsk and Bering Seas) and 
are divided into the prohibited and regulatory area. The prohi-
bited areas were primarily intended to cover any areas within 40 
miles (40-mile prohibited areas) from the coastline of the islands 
belonging to either party and from the continental coast within 
the original convention area.l52 As shown in map 7, the extent of 
the prohibited areas is to be revised, if necessary, on the basis of 
scientific evidence presented by the Soviet-Japan Fisheries 
Commission. In 1957 the areas ranging 20 miles from the region 
south of the 48th northern latitude were absorbed in the 
prohibited areas, and in 1959 the entire Sea of Okhotsk and the 
other areas adjoining the Commandorsky Islands and the Kuril 
Islands were added to them.153 As a result, up to 1962, the 
prohibited areas for salmon fishing were expanded so as to 
encompass the Sea of Japan north of the 45th northern latitude 
and the Okhotsk Sea and the western part of the Bering Sea (map 
151. For the effectiveness of the enforcing of the provisions, see infra, text 
accompanying notes 164-71. 
152. For the original convention area, see Clause 1(a) of the annex of the Soviet-
Japanese Convention and for the 40-mile prohibited areas, see id., Clause 1(b). 
153. Cf. the Soviet concept of "closed sea" at infra, text accompanying notes 
202-5. 
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7). In these areas, any Japanese salmon fishing operation is 
prohibited throughout the year. 
The Soviet-Japanese Fisheries Convention 
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In 1962, the Soviet-Japanese Commission agreed that the 
regulatory areas (in fact the convention areas excluding the entire 
prohibited areas) should be divided into two parts, Area A and 
Area B (map 7). From then onward, the conservation measures in 
the two areas have been adopted in terms of allocating the annual 
quota of s~lmon catch and in terms of restricting the gross 
tonnage of fishing vessels, the fishing period and the size of nets. 
As for the salmon fishing period, the convention stipulated only 
the closing date of the fishing period (August 10). But in 1957, 
according to the type of fishing operations, the opening and 
closing dates were fixed by the Commission as follows: (1) for 
mothership operations in Area A, May 15-August 10; (ii) for drift-
net operations in Area A by vessels operating from Japanese 
ports, June 21-August 10; (iii) for drift-net and long-line opera-
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tions in A.rea B, by vessels operating from Japanese ports, April 
30-June 30.154 
King Crab Fishing Zones. The convention had no 
provisions concerning prohibited areas. Since 1958, however, a 
king crab fishing prohibited area has been designated between 53 
degrees and 51 degrees north longitude; and since 1959 the area 
between 56 degrees 55 minutes and 56 degrees 20 minutes has also 
been so designated. In other regulatory areas, the catching of 
female crabs and small male crabs less than 13 centimeters in 
carapace width is prohibited. But the incidental catch of such 
crabs has been allowed, for example in 1957, at the ratio of one-
tenth each haul. In addition, the size of nets must be limited in 
accordance with the decision of the Joint Commission. 
Herring Fishing Zones. Actually all the convention areas 
may be called herring fishing zones since herring fishing 
operations are not prohibited in any place. Only the size of the 
herring (originally less than twenty centimeters but twenty-one in 
1958) is limited, and the incidental catch of the undersized herring 
is only allowed up to 10% of the total catch per trip. 
The Soviet-Japanese convention has never been concerned 
with the power of the engine of fishing vessels for conservation 
purposes. Yet the Sino-Japanese agreement has primarily given 
consideration to this approach. Thus, the Sino-Japanese agree-
ment intends to limit the maximum amount of annual fish 
catches, among other things, by means of restricting horsepower, 
while the Soviet-Japanese convention intends to do so by means 
of fixing the annual quota.155 
Salmon, the principal fish under the convention, is an 
anadromous fish largely residing at the time of catch in the Soviet 
territorial waters where the applicability of this convention is 
excluded. Thus the Soviet-Japanese convention naturally protects 
the coastal interest in favor of the Soviet Union since the annual 
quota, a result of hard bargaining every year by the Fisheries 
154. The relevant regulations apply only to a fixed percentage of the nets on 
board. See FAO Dep't of Fisheries, Report on Regulatory Fishery Body 13 (Rome, 
1972), FAO, Doc. F10/C/138 (1972). 
155. For the control of the annual quota, the gross tonnage of fishing vessels 
allowed has gradually been reduced from 180,400 tons in 1957 to 87,000 tons in 
1975. For the same purpose, each state is obliged to issue licenses or certificates 
allowing fishing operations in the convention areas to its own vessels and to 
inform each other of all such licenses and certificates issued. See Art. V(2), the 
Russo-Japanese Convention. 
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Commission, will extend only to the convention areas, which 
means that only Japanese fishermen will be affected by the 
quota. Iss 
In addition, the zonal approach in this case, such as closed 
areas, closed season and limited tonnage and fish size, etc., is in 
form similar to the zonal approach of the Sino-Japanese 
agreement; in substance, however, the Soviet-Japanese approach 
is much stricter than that under any other conventions under 
discussion, since stronger enforcement measures are implemented 
by the Soviet enforcing authorities. From the point of view of 
effectiveness, the Soviet-Japanese zonal approach seems to be the 
most effective of the conventions discussed here. 
3. The Tripartite Convention 
The convention areas include all the waters of the North 
Pacific Ocean. In regard to salmon fishing operations by the 
United States and Japan, the convention areas were modified to 
exclude the United States 12-mile fishery zone declared in 1966, in 
accordance with the 1974 agreement between the United States 
and Japan concerning salmon fishing. 157 The three parties (the 
United States, Canada and Japan) agreed in principle that 
salmon of North American origin in the North Pacific, halibut in 
the Northeast Pacific, and herring stocks in the Northeast Pacific 
satisfied the criteria for the so-called abstention principle. The 
convention provides for an annual review of the extent to which a 
certain stock of fish continues to qualify for abstention. 158 
The abstention principle was formulated by drawing a line in 
the Bering Sea and North Pacific Ocean at meridian 175 degrees 
west longitude, east of which Japan agreed to abstain from 
fishing for salmon. The line was established on a provisional 
basis subject to the later ecommendation of the Commission. In 
1957 herring of Alaskan origin, and in 1962 halibut in the Bering 
Sea, respectively, were removed from the abstantion formula since 
they no longer met the criteria for the principle.159 At the annual 
meeting in. November 1974, Japan agreed to ban trawllng in 
specified areas and periods during 1975 in the eastern Bering Sea 
156. Otherwise, it would be questionable whether the convention would have 
contained such provisions equally controlling the annual quotas of both parties. 
157. Supra note 136. 
158. Art III 1(a) and (b) of the Tripartite Convention. 
159. For halibut in the North Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea, Canada and the 
United States signed in 1953 the Convention for Preservation of Halibut Fishery of 
the Northern Pacific Ocean and the Bering Sea, 222 U.N.T.S. 77 (1955). 
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where halibut are taken in substantial quantities as an incidental 
catch.160 To a lesser extent, Canada also agreed to abstain from 
fishing a certain kind of salmon within a certain convention area 
of the Bering Sea east of the provisional line (map 8).161 
The abstention principle162 seems to largely represent the 
"species approach" favored by the United States. This principle is 
not directly comparable to the conservation measures under the 
Sino-Japanese agreement, but the fishery fallow zones under the 
Sino-Japanese agreement may be compared with the abstention 
areas in light of prohibition of fishing operations. The most 
convincing arguments for the principle seem to be that certain 
stocks of fish are now being fully utilized as a result of keeping up 
productivity through great expenditure of money and time, etc., 
and through restraints imposed by each party on its own 
fishermen. But Japan may say that it will participate in the 
conservation measures only as much as necessary for maintain-
ing the present level of productivity and that beyond the zone it 
should be allowed to fish on the basis of the free competition on 
the high seas. Even in this zone, the conclusive criterion for 
keeping the status quo between the conflicting interests seems to 
tum on the special interest of the coastal state existing solely by 
reason of the geographical vicinity.1sa 
160. See Jacobs, supra note 137, at 486-7, especially n.75. 
161. Protocol to the Tripartite Convention and Annex Clause 2, id. A proviso in 
Article IV(l) provides for three exceptions not applicable to the abstention 
principle with regard to: (1) any stock of fish under substantial exploitation by a 
contracting state having conditions expressed in the section 2 of the same Article 
during 25 years next preceding the entry into force of the Convention; (2) any stock 
of fish harvested in greater part by a state or states not party to this Convention; 
(3) and waters in which there is historic intermingling of the stocks of fish 
exploited by these operations, and a long-established history of joint conservation 
and regulation. 
162. For comments on this principle, see Allen, "A New Concept for Fisheries 
Treaties," 46 Am. J. lnt'l L. 319 (1952); Selak, "The Proposed International 
Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific," 46 Am. J. Int'l L. 322 
(1952); Commentary 5 to Art. 53, International Law Commission Draft (1956) of the 
Articles Concerning the Law of the Sea, reprinted in 51 Am. J. Int'l L. 230-1 (1957); 
Bishop, "General Course of Public International Law," 115 Hague Academy of 
Int'l L. Recueil des Course 316-7 (1965); Bishop, supra note 29, at 1222-28; 
Johnson, supra note 135, at 22, 29-30 et seq.; Chapman, "The Theory and Practice 
of International Fishery Development-Management," 7 San Diego L. Rev. 408, 438-
·39 (1970). For the dissenting opinions, see S. Oda, supra note 132, at 89; Japanese 
practices of International Law, 11 Jap. Ann. lnt'l L. 91 (1967); Oda, supra note 126, 
at 66-67. 
163. Cf. Agreement Concerning Shrimp between the United States and Brazil 
whereby the United States conceded a considerable interests in high seas fisheries 
to Brazil, U.S.L.C. Congressional Research Service, supra note 136 at 629. 
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B. Enforcement Mea9ures 
First, the Sino-Japanese agreement has a special feature 
which obliges ordinary fishing vessels to cooperate for enforce-
ment purposes; this feature does not appear in the three North 
Pacific fisheries conventions. Second, the Japanese-Korean 
enforcement measures are not to be applied to the domestic trawl 
and seine fishing ban areas of each state, even though some small 
parts of the Korean domestic fishing ban areas in the south 
extend slightly beyond the 12-mile exclusive fishery zone. Third, a 
feature common to all the conventions is the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the flag state in regard to prosecution and sanction. 
On the question who is to enforce the convention, as shown 
earlier, the Sino-Japanese agreement is silent; it provides only for 
the right of each state to notify any violation to the other. 164 
Under the Korean-Japanese convention, the right of control and 
jurisdiction in the joint control zone is to be exercised only by the 
flag state of the fishing vessels. 165 The Soviet-Japanese conven-
tion is silent on the question. The Tripartite convention provides 
that enforcement may be carried severally or jointly.166 However, 
the provision does not explicitly prescribe how observers are to be 
appointed in case of joint enforcement. Therefore, the effective-
ness of ihe joint enforcement scheme under the Convention is 
uncertain. The enforcing authority under the Korean-Japanese 
convention is conferred specifically on "inspection ships" and 
"authorized officials" of either party.167 Finally, the Soviet-
Japanese convention and the Tripartite convention merely 
provide for "authorized officials" as an enforcing agency. 16B 
When a "reasonable cause" is found as to a suspected 
violation by a fishing vessel, the authorized officials under the 
Korean-Japanese convention have merely the authority to notify 
the infringements to the competent officials of the other state who 
are on board their inspection ships. In other words, the right to 
halt and inspect any suspected violators is entrusted only to the 
flag state of the vessels. In the same situation, the Soviet-
Japanese convention allows such officials to board and search the 
164. In the absence of specific provisions, the general provision of Art. 6, para. 1 
of the Convention on the High Seas of 1958, relating to the jurisdiction of the flag 
state, may be applicable. 
165. Art. Vl(1). 
166. Art. X(2). 
167. Agreed Minute Clause 3(a). 
168. Art. VII(1) of the Soviet-Japanese Convention; Art. X, 1(b) of the Tripartite 
Convention. 
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vessels. If the search yields evidence that the fishing vessel is 
actually violating the convention, the convention allows the 
officials to seize the vessel or arrest the crew. Under the Tripartite 
convention such officials have the right to arrest or seize such 
person or vessel if they were engaged in illegal operations before 
the officials boarded the vessel. 169 In addition, the mere presence 
of fishing vessels in the abstention areas is sufficient cause to 
allow officials to board the vessels in order to inspect them and 
question the crew on board.170 Thus the enforcement measures 
provided in the Tripartite convention are unusually strong and 
may possibly give rise to a question about the requirement that 
vessels suffer the minimum interference or inconvenience in the 
course of fishing operations. Before starting to board or search 
any suspected violators, the Soviet-Japanese convention and the 
Tripartite conventions require inspectors to present credentials 
issued by their government if requested by the master of the 
vessel. 171 But the inspectors under the Korea-Japan convention 
and the Sino-Japanese agreement are not asked to present their 
identities since they are not authorized to board the suspected 
vessel. It may not be true that Japanese fishermen tend to observe 
treaty rules for the East Asian Seas more strictly than those for 
the Northwest or North Pacific oceans. It is therefore highly 
desirable that Chinese and Korean enforcing authorities receive 
parity of powers with the American, Canadian and Soviet 
authorities for the purpose of effective inspection of Japanese 
fishermen. 
Mter seizure or arrest of vessels or persons as a result of 
evidenced violations, under the Tripartite convention, the state to 
which the officials belong is required to notify the other state of 
such seizure or arrest, and must immediately deliver the vessels or 
persons to the authorized officials of the state to which such 
vessels or persons belong at a place to be agreed upon by the two 
states. If, however, the other party cannot accept the delivery and 
request, the party giving such notification may keep such vessels 
or persons under surveillance within its own territory, under the 
conditions agreed upon by the contracting states. In the same 
169. Art. X(1)(b). 
170. Art. X(1)(a). 
171. The incomplete functions of Korean or Japanese inspectors in relation to 
finding a suspected violation are, in an agreed minute, a little more supplemented 
by allowing inspectors of one state to board on the patrol ships of the other state, 
and· by providing the authorized officials of the other state with opportunities and 
data for inspection purposes. 
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situation, the Soviet-Japanese convention requires immediate 
delivery at the place of seizure or arrest unless another place is 
agreed upon by the two states. If the other party cannot accept 
such delivery and request, the convention imposes the aame 
obligations as those under the Tripartite convention. In this 
regard, the only difference between the two conventions is the 
matter of choosing the place of delivery of arrested or seized 
vessels. The Tripartite convention provides for the place of 
delivery to be agreed upon, while the Soviet-Japanese convention 
designates the place of seizure or arrest unless otherwise agreed. 
This seems to indicate that the immediacy of delivering action 
under the Soviet-Japanese convention may be better secured than 
that under the Tripartite convention. The reason is that in the 
event of an initial failure to the place of seizure or arrest is the 
place of delivery under the former convention but another place 
has to be agreed under the latter convention. In spite of such 
strong enforcement tools, the effectiveness of policing the 
Northwest and North Pacific fisheries has been frequently 
questioned. 172 In this sense, the inarticulate provisions on the 
enforcement measures under either: the Sino-Japanese or Korea-
Japan conventions seem to make it even harder to determine or 
deter infringements of the conventions on the spot. 
With regard to imposing sanctions, the Sino-Japanese 
agreement provides only that the flag state of vessels is obliged to 
report the result of the action to the other state, while the other 
three conventions require the flag state to impose penalties in 
furtherance of domestic laws. 173 In particular, the Tripartite and 
Korea-Japan conventions stipulate that each state must impose 
equivalent penalties for the same violations. In regard to the 
burden of proof, the Soviet-Japanese convention requires written 
evidence and proof establishing the offense, while the Tripartite 
convention provides for the presentation of witnesses and 
evidence necessary for establishing the offense.174 Both conven-
tions lack provisions regarding what evidence or witnesses have 
to be submitted but require only that they be submitted as 
promptly as possible.175 The Korea-Japan convention and the 
172. See Jacobs, supra note 137, at 488. 
173. Art. 3(2), the Sino-Japanese agreement; Art. Vl(4), the Soviet-Japanese 
convention; Art. XI(c), the Tripartite convention. 
174. Art. VII(3), the Soviet-Japanese convention; id. the Tripartite convention. 
175. Cf. Art. 9(11), the Scheme of Joint Enforcement and the Conduct 
Convention of 1967, which provides, in part, that ... no state would be required to 
submit higher evidential value than it would possess. For the text, see 6 Int'l Legal 
Mats 760 (1967). 
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Sino-Japanese agreement have no provision relating to the burden 
of proof. 
C. Fisheries Commission 
There are several features shared by the joint commissions 
under the Sino-Japanese agreement and the other North Pacific 
conventions, even though the substance of each common charac-
teristic is not identical. In regard to voting procedure, the 
requirements are similar. Under the Tripartite convention, a 
unanimous vote is required if the matters are related to all three 
contracting states, but if they are concerned with two of the states 
a unanimous vote is not necessarily required. The Sino-Japanese 
agreement, the Soviet-Japanese convention and the Korea-Japan 
convention require only a mutual agreement or concurrence.176 
Normally it may be said that fishery commissions do not 
possess supranational authority and thus the conservation 
measures they formulate and adopt are not directly binding on 
individual fishermen without local legislation.177 This is true to 
the extent that recommendation is the key function performed by 
all the Commissions under consideration and the decision-making 
function is confined only to certain fields. 178 The power to make 
decisions usually concerns technical matters such as the rules of 
procedure and the conduct of meetings. 179 Any broad decision-
making function would thus constitute an exception to the 
generally recommendatory authority of a fisheries commission. 
The Commission under the Sino-Japanese agreement may 
review matters concerning the fishery control measures; if 
necessary, the Commission may recommend to the contracting 
states a revision of the conservation measures. The contracting 
governments may revise such measures by means of an exchange 
of notes accepting the Commission's recommendation. Another 
function of the Commission is to exchange fishery data and to 
176. See Art. 6(2) of the Sino-Japanese agreement; Art. VI(3) of the Korea-Japan 
convention; Art. III(3} of the Soviet-Japanese convention; and Art. Il(3) of the 
Tripartite convention. 
177. See G. Knight, supra note 44 at 687. 
178. For a general discussion of the recommendation and decision functions, 
see Burke, "Aspects of Internal Decision-Making Processes in Intergovernmental 
Fishery Commissions," 43 Wash. L. Rev. 116, 169-74 (1967). 
179. Except for the Sino-Japanese Agreement, the other three conventions lay 
down identical provisions which read as follows: "the Commission may decide 
upon and revise, as occasion may require, rules for the conduct of its meetings." 
For an example, see Art. Vl(4), the Korea-Japan convention. 
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review the current status of fisheries in the fishing zones. In 
addition, if necessary, the Commission may review matters 
concerning the preservation of fishery resources and related 
problems, and it may recommend to the two states measures to be 
taken as a result of such review. Thus the Sino-Japanese 
agreement does not confer on the Commission any decision-
making authority and it is only empowered to make recommenda-
tions which have binding force on member states. 
The function of the Commission under the Korean-Japenese 
convention lies between the Sino-Japanese Commission on the 
one hand the Soviet-Japanese and the Tripartite Commissions on 
the other hand. In regard to the conservation measures enforced 
in the fishing zones, the Korea-Japan Commission is authorized to 
review and, if necessary, recommend to the contracting states new 
measures. The recommendation concerning new measures may 
include proposals for a revision of the current conservation 
measures. 180 However, the Commission is not empowered to decide 
directly on any new measures. Furthermore, the contracting states 
are not obliged to accept all the recommendations made by the 
Commission; they are only required to respect the recommenda-
tions to the extent possible. Thus the recommendatory function of 
the Korean-Japanese Commission is just about the same as that 
of the Sino-Japanese Commission. In that regard, the Soviet-
Japanese is authorized not only to consider and to revise, if 
necessary, the coordinated measures upon the scientific basis, but 
also authorized to make recommendations to the contracting 
states concerning conservation and increase of fishery resources. 
The most important function performed by the Soviet-Japanese 
Commission is that the Commission is given legal authority to 
determine the annual quotas of fish catches.1B1 These quotas are 
binding on each member state upon notification. On the same 
matter, in the Tripartite convention the Commission may 
determine to continue the abstention principle in relation to fish 
specified in the annex; it may also decide to apply or cease to 
apply the abstention principle to other stocks of fish. 182 Such 
determinations must be based, in the first place, on scientific 
evidence and then must be accompanied by a consideration of the 
180. Art. VII(a) and (c). 
181. Art. IX(b). Salmon is the only stock the total amount of the catch of which 
shall be determined by the Commission. 
182. It was, however, understood that no determination or recommendation is 
to be made for 5 years after the entry into force of this convention. See Art. III(l)(a) 
and (b). 
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effect of strikes, wars or exceptional economic or biological 
conditions.183 Another key function is to determine whether the 
stock of fish under control of the abstention formula is being fully 
utilized since the current full utilization of fish is an important 
ground for justification of the principle. Moreover, the Tripartite 
Commission is authorized to decide and recommend the need for 
joint conservation with regard to any stock of fish under 
substantial exploitation by two or more contracting states, and 
not covered by a conservation agreement between the parties at 
the time of conclusion of the convention. The Commission is also 
entitled to request the contracting states to report regularly the 
conservation measures taken for the stocks of fish specified in the 
annex. Recommendations made by the Tripartite Commission are 
not directly binding on member states. Instead, member states 
recognized only the desirability of such recommendations and the 
necessity of imposing restraints on their nationals and fishing 
vessels in conformity with the recommendations. Thus, recom-
mendations have only an advisory function to member states. 
In regard to the legal capacity conferred upon the Commis-
sions, only the Tripartite convention empowers the Commission to 
employ personneP 84 and acquire facilities and to utilize the 
technical and scientific services from any public or private 
institution of the contracting states and their political subdivi-
sions. Other questions concerning the privileges and immunities 
of the commissions in the course of performing their missions in 
each contracting state have not been answered by any of the 
conventions under discussion. 1B5 
Another important function of fisheries commissions is to 
study and secure information in order to serve as a basis for 
decision, recommendation or general policy. Except for the Sino-
Japanese agreement, the conventions under consideration all 
stipulate the intelligence functions of their commissions. The 
Korean-Japanese convention provides that the Commission is to 
compile and study records and to review the necessary matters 
concerning· conservation measures, while the Soviet-Japanese 
convention provides that for the purpose of studying the fishery 
resources, the Commission is to prepare and adjust coordinated 
183. Art. IX 1(b)(ii) and 2. 
184. Art. 11(13). 
185. Cf. the legal capacity of the International Pacific Halibut Commission 
within the United States. It is designated as an international public organization 
entitled to privileges and immunities, and it possesses the capacity to make 
contracts, to acquire and dispose of property, and to bring suit. See 22 U.S. C. § 288 
(1964). 
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scientific research programs. The Tripartite convention requires 
the Commission, first, to study specified stocks of fish, in order to 
determine whether they meet certain abstention conditions 
provided for one or two of the parties, or to determine whether 
there is a need for joint conservation measures. Second, the 
Commission is obliged to investigate the waters of the convention 
area to determine whether there are areas in which salmon 
originating in the rivers of Canada and of the United States 
intermingle with salmon originating in the rivers of Asia. Third, 
the Commission is required to conduct further studies with the 
purpose of recommending new areas in which the exploitation of 
salmon should be forbidden by abstention. Lastly, the Commis-
sion is to compile data and study records which it might obtain 
from the parties and to submit reports of its activities to the 
parties. . 
In general, gathering information and planning studies are 
essential to all the rest of the functions of fisheries commissions. 
The authority and responsibility for information gathering and 
planning are different among the commissions. This information 
and study function is usually decentralized and given to a 
subcommittee or special panel. For example, the Korean-Japanese 
Commission is authorized to establish its own research program 
without consulting the agencies of the two member governments. 
In accordance with such a research program, the Subcommittee 
on Fishery Resources is to conduct research and information 
activities and to report them to the Commission. But the Tripartite 
Commission is to establish the research program in general 
outline only, after consulting the agencies of the three member 
states. The major intelligence function is undertaken in various 
committees. The two major committees involved are the Commit-
tee on Biology and Research and the Ad Hoc Committee on 
Abstention. 1B6 
D. Maritime Stecurity Zone 
The problem of protecting the maritime security interests is 
one of the difficulties to be solved in the law of the sea 
186. See Int'l North Pacific Fisheries Comm'n, [1974] Proceeding of the 21st 
Annual Meeting 119-26, 277-85 (1974). In this regard, the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) is the only world-wide organization performing intelligence 
functions on fisheries. See FAO Dep't of Fisheries, Report on FAO, the FAO 
Committee on Fisheries and International and Regional Fishery Bodies 9-11 
(1975), FAO Doc. FID/C/331. 
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conferences. In short, two conflicting interests are involved: (1) 
free transit of straits and narrower territorial waters, 187 and (2) 
broader national sovereignty over the areas. 188 
As a national expression of this interest, Japan first instituted 
maritime security zones in accordance with the Imperial Act of 
1907, which extended to a distance of seven miles beyond the 
territorial waters. 189 Currently, there are about 20 maritime 
security zones in the world under the names of neutrality zones, 
defense zones and marine control zones. 190 In 1917, the United 
States and Panama proclaimed certain "defensive sea areas," 
some of which were later discontinued. During World War II, the 
nations of the Western Hemisphere purported to establish a 
"neutrality zone" for continental protection (the Declaration of 
Panama of 1939). In the early 1950's, China designated three 
military areas for the sake of defense security. In 1952, a Korean 
sea defense zone was established around the Korean Peninsula. In 
1950 and 1951, respectively, United States and Canadian air 
defense identification zones were promulgated. 
The Chinese military zones are unique in view of their 
acceptance in the bilateral fisheries agreement. Thus, it seems 
worth discussing the legality of the zones and the relation 
between the security right and the fishing right. The issues 
involved herein are so delicate and important that lengthy 
discussions are needed. At this point, however, only a brief 
comment will be made on the issues, after looking at some state 
practices on the matter. 
187. See Dean, "Freedom of the Seas," 37 Foreign Affairs 83-86 (1958); Jessup, 
"The U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea," Columbia Essays in Int'l L. 201 
(1965); Janis, "The Soviet Navy and Ocean Law" U.S. Naval War College Review 
52 (Mar.·Apr. 1974); for the particular U.S. position, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.62/C.2/L.86 (1974); Osgood, "U.S. Security Interests in Ocean Law," 2 
Ocean Deuel. and Int'l L. J. 1, particularly 3-4 (1974). 
188. For example, see Anand, "The Tyranny of the Freedom of the Seas 
Doctrine," 12 Int'l Studies 416 (1973); for particular positions of some developing 
states, see U.N. Doc. AtCONF.62/C.2/L.4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 16, 19, etc. (1974). 
189. For details, see Tausing, "Territorial Control and Jurisdiction over Sea 
Area," 71 U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, No. 6 at 815-23 (1945). 
190. See lvanashehinko, "Concerning Marine Security Areas," found in The 
Legal Regime of the World Ocean 121-2 (M. Lazarev and V. Tkachenko, eeL 1973); 
for state practices, see Int'l L. Comm'n Second Report on the Regime of the 
Territorial Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/61 at 11-24 (1953); and for numerical show of 
state practices on the functional zone claims beyond 3 miles, see III H. Lay, R. 
Churchill & M. Nordquist, New Directions in the Law of the Sea 165-6 (1973). 
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1. Chinese Military Zone 
In the early 1950's, China unilaterally designated three areas 
on the high seas adjacent or along its coast as "military areas" for 
the purpose of defense security and military necessity.19 1 All the 
three zones were incorporated into the non-governmental arrange-
ments, but the Military Navigational Zone has been discontinued 
since December 22, 1975 in conformity with the present govern-
mental agreement. The Military Navigational Zone was situated 
in the coastal waters south of Shanghai wherein no vessel was 
admitted at any time (map 4). Thus, the Chinese military zones 
currently in force are as follows: 
(1) In the Military Security Zone on the northern part of the 
Yellow Sea, all vessels can enter only with the permis-
sion of the Chinese Authorities concerned; and 
(2) in the Military Operational Zone in the waters north of 
Taiwan and south of 29°N, vessels are advised not to 
fish, otherwise they should bear risks arising from their 
entries (map 5). 
In principle, China seems to think that any coastal state may 
establish its marine security zone whenever it deems it necessary. 
From the Chinese viewpoint, in reality, the physical environment 
in relation to North-South Korea is in such a stance that China 
would feel some potential threat to its security in the Yellow Sea 
and the East China Sea because of complications in political 
relations among the countries to which peace in the Korean 
Peninsula is an important security concern. 
In legal terms, the provision of the military zones raises the 
crucial issue of whether the zones are applicable only to Japanese 
fishing vessels or all vessels regardless of nationality. When 
Japan accepted the military zones with an understanding that 
"the regulation of the zones shall be applied to all vessels 
regardless of nationality," China acquiesced in it without any 
condition. In contract terms, the Japanese acceptance with 
understandings (conditions) may be regarded as a counteroffer. 
Since the Japanese counteroffer was accepted without any 
modification, the contract (treaty) should be interpreted in 
accordance with the terms. As a result, it seems appropriate to 
understand the issue in the sense that Japanese fishing vessels as 
191. For the background of the Chinese experience in the security issue in the 
early 20th century, see J. Wheeler-Bennett et al., Information on the Problem of 
Security (1917-1926) 210-18 (1927). 
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well as other vessels regardless of nationality and mission would 
be controlled by the regulation of the Chinese military zones when 
they entered the zones.192 
2. Korean Sea Defense Zone 
The Sea Defense Zone was proclaimed in September 1952 by 
the Commander of the United Nations Forces in Korea during the 
height of the Korean War and thus the line of its delimitation was 
sometimes called the "Clark Line" after the Commander's name 
(map 9). 193 It encircled the Korean coastal waters within the Peace 
(Rhee) Line limits starting at a point twelve miles offshore from 
the Soviet border on the east and reaching a point twelve miles 
from the Manchurian border on the west. The zone existed for 
eleven months. In August 1953, it was suspended due to the 
Armistice Agreement prohibiting coastal blockade.194 
As a war-time measure, the defense zone had two main 
purposes. One was to safeguard the Korean coastline and the 
communication lines of the United Nations forces. The other was 
to suspend trouble between Korean police patrol ships and 
Japanese fishing vessels that crossed over what was then called 
the "MacArthur Line" and later the "Peace Line" which divided 
Korean and Japanese waters. According to the Proclamation, all 
ships were to be subject to search by the United Nations forces if 
they entered the blockade. Japanese fishing vessels also were 
completely barred from entering it. 
Japan and the Soviet Union immediately protested against 
the Proclamation of the Zone.195 In a legal sense, it is interesting 
to note the difference between the Japanese and Soviet protests. 
Japan argued that the zone as specified in the announcement had 
nothing to do with fishing rights. But the Soviet Union basically 
denied that a belligerent had the right196 in time of war to 
establish a security zone on the high seas close to shores. 
192. See Cheng, supra note 46, at 64; Bethill, "People's China and the Law of 
the Sea," 8 Int'l Lawyer, 1724, 741 (1974). 
193. See M. Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu 154 (1954). 
194. See Art. 2(15), Korean Armistice Agreement, signed at Panmunjom, Korea, 
on July 27, 1952. 
195. For the Japanese and Soviet protests and the United States State 
Department's answer to the Soviet protest, see Clark supra note 193, at 156, 155-6, 
respectively. For further discussions, see infra, text accompanying note 206. 
196. For the belligerent rights in this area, see B. Williams, State Security and 
the League of Nations 43, et seq. (1927); Henkin, "Changing Law for the Changing 
Seas," Uses of the Seas 86-7 (the American Assembly, Col. Uni. ed. 1968); W. 
Bishop, supra note 34, at 393-7; and B. Brittin and L. Watson, International Law 
for Seagoing Officers 227 (3rd ed. 1972). 
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3. Other State Practices 
Latin America. In October 1939, the American Republics 
(including the United States) adopted the "Declaration of 
Panama." The Declaration referred to the past proposals during 
the World War of 1914-18, by which the Governments of 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru had urged 
belligerents to refrain from hostile acts near the shores of 
America, and it referred to the protection needed for a "zone of 
security including all the normal maritime routes of communica-
tion and trade between the countries of America." The Declaration 
claimed that the American republics were, as of inherent right, 
entitled to have those waters free from any hostile act by any non-
American belligerent nation. 197 
The legal issue involved in the neutral zone is how to reconcile 
jurisdictions between belligerents and neutral states. In state 
practice, there· is evidence that neutral states may exercise 
jurisdiction over foreign vessels beyond the territorial limits to 
safeguard their national defense. Yet the belligerent may visit and 
search neutral craft, may capture enemy merchant ships, and 
may attack enemy warships on the high seas.198 In this situation, 
another serious issue would be whether the neutral states had the 
ability to control the entire neutral zone effectively. 
United States and Canada. In the United States, there 
were thirty-three defensive sea areas in force between 1917 and 
1918. With one exception of one area (off the coast of North 
Carolina), they were all outside the United States continent. Those 
areas have generally been limited to the territorial waters. During 
World War II there were 17 maritime control zones. Pursuant to 
the Anti-Smuggling Act of August 5, 1935, customs enforcement 
areas were set up. In addition, there were some harbors closed to 
foreign vessels. But they were all discontinued either in 1945 or in 
1946.199 
197. For the text of the Declaration, see U.S. Naval War College, 1939 
International Law Situation with Solutions and Notes 66-8 (1940); 1 Dep't State 
Bull. 331-3 (1939). 
198. For comments on the Declaration, see U.S. Naval War College, id. at 60-8; 
Masterson, "The Declaration of the Hemisphere Zone of Security and the Law," 26 
A.B.A.J. Int'l L. 112 (1940). Concerning general collective security issues, see 
McNair, "Collective Security," 17 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 150 (1936). For the United 
States position on the matter, see 7 Hackworth, International Law 703 (1943). 
199. 46 U.S. Naval War College, 1948-49 International Law Documents 157-77 
(1950); N. Padefold, Public Policy for the Seas (Rev. ed.) 31-2 (1970). 
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In 1950 and 1951 the United States and Canada promulgated 
Air Defence Identification Zones (ADIZ and CADIZ) for security 
purposes in the air spaces over the domestic and coastal areas of 
the United States and Canada. 200 Both the Canadian and United 
States legislation have the same aim, national security, and both 
seek to achieve it by the same general method. In a legal sense, 
the main differences between the United States and Canadian 
ADIZs are: First, the United States regulations do not impose any 
altitude limitation for flights entering the Atlantic ADIZ, though 
a 4000 feet limitation is imposed in the other United States ADIZ. 
The Canadian ADIZ regulations apply only to flights at or above 
4000 feet; second, the Canadian ADIZ applies to any aircraft 
entering a CADIZ, while the United States ADIZ applies only to 
aircraft destined for the United States. As regard the legality of 
the zones under international law, it was argued that the 
Canadian and the United States security regulations would be 
justified on the basis of self-preservation.201 
The Soviet Union. The Soviet Union established fortified 
zones in certain areas contiguous to the Union. It is not explicit 
about the maximum limit of the zones. All merchant vessels, 
whether of U.S.S.R. or foreign nationality, are not allowed to enter 
without previous permission. All vessels proceeding through a 
fortified zone are required to observe special rules provided by the 
Soviet Union.202 In addition, "Soviet writers claimed, with 
approval of their government, that certain seas bordering the 
Soviet Union were closed. Included in this category are the Black 
200. For the text of the Executive Order Concerning United States Security 
Control of Air Traffic, see 51 U.S. Naval War College, [1956] International Law, 
Situation and Documents 579-92 (B. MacChesney ed. 1957); for the Canadian 
Rules for the Security Control of Air Traffic, see id. at 592-600. 
201. For the theoretical justification of the zones, authors have invoked the 
difference between right of self-defence and right of self-preservation, which means 
that the exercise of self-defence by a state must be accompanied by the imminent 
danger of attack before taking measures for its protection, while the concept of self-
preservation is not so strict and would permit preventive measures for the safety of 
the state. For details, see Martial, "State Control of the Air Space Over the 
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone," 30 Can. B. Rev. 245, 263 (1952); J. 
Murchison, The Contiguous Air Space Zone in International Law 55, et seq. (1956). 
202. The first notices to mariners concerning rules for navigation in the 
Fortified Zones were issued in 1955 and they were amended in part by the Notices 
to Mariners of January 1, 1967. For the texts of the two Notices, see 2 U.N. Leg. 
Ser., Laws and Regulations on the Regime of the Territorial Sea 263-4 (1957), U.N. 
Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/6 (1956); 1 H. Lay, R. Churchill, and M. Nordquist, New 
Directions in the Law of the Sea 32-4 (1973), respectively. 
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Sea, Caspian Sea, and Baltic Sea. The Soviet 'Sea of Peace' 
campaign concerning the Baltic Sea was essentially a program to 
'neutralize' that sea by declaring it out of bounds to warships of 
all countries except those bordering on it."203 Many Soviet jurists 
also consider the Okhotsk Sea to be both a closed and historic sea 
and would prohibit the navigation of foreign warships therein. 204 
As regard the Sea of Japan, the Soviet Union proposed in the 
draft U.S.S.R. peace treaty with Japan to close the straits leading 
into the Sea to the warships of non-contiguous states. 205 
Comment. In the modern context, most of the marine 
security zones were instituted in furtherance of wartime measures. 
They are not directly related to the fishing rights of the neutral 
vessels since such fishing operations are, in most cases, excluded 
from those areas in time of war. In a practical sense, it seems 
doubtful whether neutral fishing vessels are entitled to claim 
affirmatively their fishing rights vis-a-vis the security rights of 
coastal states on the high seas relatively close to the shores, when 
the coastal states are engaged in hostile activities. But it seems 
another question whether vessels used exclusively for fishing 
along the coast should be exempt from capture by the belligerent, 
no matter whether the fishing vessels are enemy or neutral. 206 
It is, in any event, highly desirable that the conflicting 
interests between security uses and other uses such as fishing, 
navigation or "really pure" scientific research, etc. are to be 
minimized by using such criteria as reasonableness and relativi-
ty.207 In a prize case, the United States Supreme Court, invoking 
203. B. Brittin and L. Watson, supra note 197, at 143; W. Butler, The Law of 
Soviet Territorial Waters 19-24 (1967). 
204. Id. at 79. 
205. Pravda, Sept. 7, 1951, cited in id. 
206. Compare Art. 21 and 22 of the Draft Convention on Rights and Duties of 
Neutral States in Naval and Aerial War, found in 33 Am. J. Int'l L. 361 (1939), with 
Art. 3 of the 11th Hague Convention of 1907 on Rights and Duties of Neutral 
Powers in Naval War, signed at Hague, on October 18, 1907, found in 1 C. Bevans, 
Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America 
1776-1949, 719 (1968); for the right of requisitioning of neutral ships, see the 
Proclamation of President Wilson, found in 6 Hackworth, Digest of International 
Law 648-9 (1943); Bullock, "Angary," 3 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 99 (1922-23); for the 
general discussions on the international law of neutrality, see Kunz, "Neutrality 
and the European War, 1939-40," 39 Mich. L. Rev. 719 (1941); 2 L. Oppenheim, 
International Law 287-447a (Lauterpacht 7th ed. 1952); 11 Whiteman, Interna-
tional Law 138-475 (1968); and Bishop, supra note 34, at 1034. 
207. See P. Rao, The Public Order of Ocean Resources: A Critique of the 
Contemporary Law of the Sea 171 (1975). 
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the international precedents and authorities on the subject, held, 
in 1900, that "coastal fishing vessels, with their implements and 
supplies, cargoes and crews, unarmed and honestly pursuing their 
peaceful calling of catching and bringing in fresh fish, are exempt 
from capture as prize of war."20B This judgment contains criteria 
by which such security versus non-security interests ought to be 
resolved. 
In reality as applied to the East Asian seas (or elsewhere), no 
clear answer may be made as to how far coastal states may 
exercise their security jurisdiction over the neutral fishing vessels 
in time of "quasi-hostility" or cease-fire. A Chinese claim that her 
military zones are an expression of sovereign right seems 
excessive, since sovereignty on the high seas is accompanied by 
an obligation prohibiting an abuse of right. But if China relied on 
the theory of self-preservation rather than on that of self-defence, 
it would be in a secure position for arguing the pros and cons in 
an academic forum. As earlier interpreted, Chinese enforcement of 
the regulation of the military zones on all foreign vessels could 
impair the legal rights of third nations. Under international law 
no treaty has binding effect on a third party without the consent 
of the latter. This issue, however, has never been tested. Lastly, it 
is to be pointed out that the current Conference on the Law of the 
Sea seems not to pay much attention to the specific problems 
involved in the maritime security zones. 209 
VI. CONCLUSION 
If the economic zone concept210 is adopted on a universal 
basis, the entire East Asian Seas will fall under the 200-mile limit 
of the respective coastal states. In geographical sense, therefore, 
Japan would be completely excluded from the Chinese and Korean 
economic zones in the Yellow Sea. In the East China Sea and the 
Sea of Japan, Japanese fishermen would be allowed to enter only 
their section of the economic zone divided by median lines 
between the respective neighboring states. This also m_eanl? that 
208. This was a case of condemning two Spanish fishing vessels and cargos as 
prize of war. For details, see the Paquete Habana and The Lola, 175 U.S. 677 
(1900); for a treaty provision, see the first part of Art. 3 of the 11th Hague 
Convention of 1907, cited in supra note 206. 
209. See Osgood, supra note 187, at 31-6. 
210. At the outset, it should be noted that the important issues which have 
arisen with respect to the economic zone have not yet been compromised by the 
negotiating nations. For details, see Taft, "The Third U.N. Law of the Sea 
Conference: Major Unresolved Fisheries Issues," 14 Col. J. Transnat'l L. 112, 113 
(1975). 
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Japanese fishermen would be excluded from the agreed fishing 
zones (including the Chinese military and conservation zones) 
under either the Sino-Japanese or the Korea-Japan agreement. 211 
Thus, it is assumed that the present level of Japanese fishing 
participation in the region would be affected by the new limit even 
if it is coupled with the concept of full utilization of living 
resources212 and by the policies of the respective coastal states 
toward the limit. 
According to statements presented in the current sessions of 
the Law of the Sea Conference, China and North Korea, in 
principle, adhere to rigid exclusivity of jurisdiction within the 
zone, while South Korea and Japan basically support the concept 
of the zone coupled with the full utilization principle. With regard 
to the Sino-Japanese fishing relations, two things may be 
predicted. First, China might extend the limit of fishing areas 
regulated under the Sino-Japanese agreement by the influence of 
the economic zone concept since the present agreement does not 
prejudice the position of the two states on jurisdiction over the 
seas. Second, in addition to the horsepower limit, China might 
take advantage of the new zone for banning larger Japanese 
fisheries companies from participating in the Yell ow and East 
China Seas, allowing only smaller fisheries firms to operate in the 
regions. With respect to Japanese-Korean fishing relations, the 
two states have met a new era. Recently there emerged a reverse 
trend whereby Japanese coastal fishermen have begun to be 
adversely affected by the presence of Korean fishermen operating 
off the coasts of Japanese islands of Hokkaido and Honshu. The 
Korean-Japanese convention does not cover these areas. The 
Japanese Government therefore asked the Korean Government for 
three things: (1) self-restraints on the fishing operation by Korean 
fishermen, (2) establishment of a dispute settlement commission 
on a non-governmental basis, (3) and conclusion of a new 
agreement to deal with the matters such as prevention of marine 
incidents and emergency rescue, which arise from the new trend. 
211. For a general view of the impact, see Alexander and Hodgson, "The 
Impact of the 200-mile Economic Zone on the Law of the Sea," 12 San Diego L. 
Rev. 569 (1975); for a short view of the impact on the East Asian Seas, see 
Johnston, "Some Treaty Law Aspects of A Future International Fishing 
Convention," in The Future of International Fisheries Management 103, 138-46 
(G. Knight ed. 1975); Park, "Marine Resource Conflicts in the North Pacific" 
(publication pending). 
212. See Johnston, "Regional Consequences of a Global Fisheries Conven-
tion," in Fisheries Conflicts in the North Atlantic: Problems of Management and 
Jurisdiction 36-8 (G. Pontecorvo ed. 1974). 
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Such newly emerging situations and the hypothesis of the 
economic zone concept would lead the two governments to review 
the overall problems relating to readjustment of the Korean-
Japanese convention. 21 3 
If no international agreement is reached on the economic 
zone, it seems likely that China would probably respect the first 
three-year duration of the Sino-Japanese agreement without being 
much influenced by the newly emerging state practices extending 
fishing limits to 200 miles. The reason would be that the accord 
was ratified at the time when the world-wide consensus on the 
economic zone was already evident. On the other hand, it does not 
seem likely that Korea would request a substantial revision of the 
Korean-Japanese convention in order to utilize the new limit since 
Korea would not want to weaken its position with other states in 
relation to distant-water fishing. It seems probable, however, that 
Korea would reinforce its position on the coastal jurisdiction for 
specific purposes such as security or more strict conservation, etc. 
In short, if (1) the Conference adopts the treaty but Japan does not 
sign it and (2) the Conference cannot reach any agreement, it does 
not seem likely that, ignoring the world-wide evidence in favor of 
the new limit and the recently unilateral or regional extensions of 
the limit by several states such as Canada, the European 
Common Market Countries, the United States, and the Soviet 
Union, Japan would challenge its neighbors' extensions of coastal 
jurisdiction in the same manner as it contested the Korean Peace 
(Rhee) Line in the 1950's and early 1960's.214 
The impacts of the new limit on the coastal state's economy 
would not be identical in all situations. In general, China and 
North Korea, which do not have distant-water fleets, seem likely 
to increase their fish catches because there would be less 
competition within their coastal areas. But in the short term, 
Japan, South Korea and to a lesser extent Taiwan, with 
significant distant-water fleets, would be adversely affected 
because their distant-water fleets' fishing would be restricted by 
213. For the other view, see Johnston, supra note 211, at 142. 
214. Japan itself already announced a 200-mile exclusive fishing zone. 
However, Japan may rely on the concept of "historic right" to continue fishing 
operations in the regions. But the continuing validity of the concept does not seem 
to be certain. For details, see L. Alexander, Offshore Geography of Northwestern 
Europe 101-4 (1966); for comment on the I.C.J. ruling on the concept in the United 
Kingdom v. Iceland; Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland, see Churchill, ''The 
Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases: The Contribution of the International Court of 
Justice to the Debate on Coastal States' Fisheries Rights," 24 Int'l Comp. L. Q. 82, 
98 (1975). 
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the new limit. In the long tenn, however, the three countries would 
recover their temporary decline of fishing industry by reorganiz-
ing their domestic fisheries managements into more commercially 
profitRhle forms, and by expanding fisheries joint ventures with 
foreign states which want to lease fishing rights within their 
economic zcnes. It is not entirely improbable that the current 
fisheries regulations in the East Asian region, which are solely 
based on biological goals such as catch quotas, closed areas, 
closed seasons and other restrictions on the sizes of fish, vessel 
and gear, etc., might be combined with some new managerial 
schemes, if the latter prove more efficient in fish catches in other 
regions. 
The extensive use of the economic zone without the coastal 
state's exercising its responsibility215 for preventing environmen-
tal deterioration would eventually contribute to the realization of 
the common need to establish regional controls for pollution 
abatement. The flow of the North Equatorial Current (black 
current) is regular and directional in the South and East China 
and Yellow Seas. 216 A coastal pollution is therefore likely to 
disseminate in the entire region. This environmental physical 
element might sei ve as a factor by which all the coastal states 
would be forced to cope with pollution problems together in 
disregard of ideological and political differences in the region. 
The fisheries conflicts in the economic zone might not be 
satisfactorily ended without solving disputes over non-living 
resources in the continental shelf. 217 The continental shelves of 
the Yell ow and East China Seas are considered as potential areas 
for oil and gas deposits. Thus, controversies between the coastal 
states over the shelf limits have been heated. In general, the limit 
of the economic zone based on the distance concept might help to 
soften the pending disputes based on other geographical factors 
such as the idea of natural prolongation of land mass and the 
median line principle. In part, it is assumed that Japan and South 
Korea are likely to develop jointly a shelf area overlapped by their 
unilateral claims in accordance with a new agreement concerning 
joint devel<)pment,218 without being much influenced by the new 
economic zone limit. 
215. In the East Asian areas, the regional controls of marine pollution are 
virtually non-existing; there is a "vacuum" in this respect. 
216. See supra text accompanying note 9. 
217. See E. Jones, Law of the Sea: Oceanic Resources 82-84 (1972). 
218. The Agreement was signed at Se<>ul, on January 30, 1974. Korea already 
ratified it. Finally, the Japanese Diet acted on the ratification of the Agreement on 
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From the security point of view, the East Asian seas are 
regarded as one of the regions susceptible to international power 
politics. As shown, since the first Sino-Japanese non-
governmental fisheries arrangement in 1955, Japan has accepted 
the Chinese military zones in accordance with the previous non-
governmental and current governmental agreements. Late in 
October 1975, South Korea unilaterally banned Japanese fishing 
operations in its demilitarization line waters in the Yellow Sea 
and the Sea of Japan, declaring them to be "waters contacting the 
enemies."219 In consequence, it seems likely that the geographical 
feature arising from the region's character as a semi-enclosed 
sea, 220 the susceptibility to international politics, and the state 
practices in the region might possibly lead to tighter security 
regulations as the coastal jurisdiction expands further.22I 
Even if the Law of the Sea Conference successfully adopts the 
international conservation measures, such a formulation might 
not provide specific guidelines appropriate for and applicable to 
every region of the oceans. It is already known that prevention of 
waste of fisheries economy might be achieved by removing the 
condition of free and open access to the oceans and by limiting the 
amount of fishing efforts.222 Moreover, the existing bilateral 
schemes might not comprehensively deal with the future regional 
problems which will arise from the extensive use of the economic 
zone. In order to avoid conflicts and achieve better economic 
goals, it seems highly desirable that each state in the region 
May 28, 1977. Thus, the Japanese ratification would be in effect as of June 8, 1977. 
See Tong-A flbo at 1 (May 31, 1977). This Agreement would unprecedentedly open 
an era of a resource cooperation between the two States. What results the 
persistent Chinese protest to it would bring about, however, remain to be seen. 
219. The Korea Herald, at 3 (January 6, 1976). 
220. For the character of regional arrangements in semi-enclosed seas, see 
Alexander and Hodgson, supra note 211, at 598. 
221. For susceptibility of these regions, see Osgood, supra note 187, at 12. 
222. For details, see F. Christy, Jr. Alternative Arrangements for Marine 
Fisheries: An Overview 16, et seq. (1973). A report of the FAO Dep't of Fisheries 
shows that in the Yellow and East China Seas the stocks of both demersal and 
pelagic fish are probably close to being fully exploited, though the statistical and 
other data are not reliable, and that it is likely that some increase in sustained 
catch could be obtained from further management measures, especially those 
based on better scientific and statistical data. For details, see FAO Dep't of 
Fisheries, Review of the Status of Some Heavily Exploited Fish Stocks 11-2 (1973), 
FAO, Doc. FID/C/313 (1973); FAO Dep't of Fisheries, Review of the Status of 
Exploitation of the World Fish Resources 7-9 (1974), FAO Doc. FIRS/C328 (1974). 
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should be ready to discuss an effective regional agreement. 22·1 
Regional arrangements would, of course, require some modifica-
tion of national jurisdiction and less emphasis on ideology 
between conflicting states. But the appropriate regional arrange-
ment probably would better serve the interests of the region as a 
whole as well as those of each coastal state in the long run since 
such arrangements would deal with problems arising out of 
similar interests by means of regional uniformity by which 
conflicts would be reduced and fair benefit and treatment would 
be received by all. The regional rule seems more desirable in the 
light of the idea that a well-formed legal channel will reduce 
political and economic pressures existing between the larger and 
smaller states and will enable such disputes to be solved by the 
principle of equality before the law.224 
223. For a discussion of the regional agreements, see Bishop, supra note 162, at 
1206-7; Johnston, supra note 137, at 102; Ottenheimer, "Patterns of Development 
in International Fishery Law," 11 Can. Y.B. Int'l L. 37, 40 (1973). 
224. This idea was suggested by an author while discussing problems relating 
to dispute-settlement. For details, see Sohn, "Settlement of Disputes Arising Out of 
the Law of the Sea Convention," 12 San Diego L. Rev. 495, 516 (1975). 

